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 Model-Based Fault Tolerant Control 
 
Aditya Kumar and Daniel Viassolo 
GE Global Research 
Niskayuna, New York 12301 
 
1. Abstract 
The Model Based Fault Tolerant Control (MBFTC) Phase II program was conducted under the NASA 
Aviation Safety and Security Program (AvSSP). The goal of the MBFTC is to develop and demonstrate 
aircraft engine Model-Based Fault Tolerant Control strategies. The specific objective is to accommodate 
anomalous behavior such as sensor faults, actuator faults, or turbine gas-path component damage that 
can lead to in-flight shutdowns (IFSD) or aborted takeoffs (ATO), asymmetric thrust/loss of thrust control 
(LOTC) or engine surge/stall events. Such events, often when coupled with pilot error, can compromise 
aircraft safety. In this program, we selected four different faults as prime candidates for MBFTC on-line 
detection and accommodation. These faults included a sensor (Compressor discharge pressure, PS3), 
an actuator (variable geometry, VG) and two component (high pressure compressor, HPC, and high 
pressure turbine, HPT) faults. For these faults, we developed a suite of model-based fault detection 
algorithms and evaluated their performance over the entire flight envelope and in the presence of 
engine-to-engine variation and deterioration. Based on the performance and maturity of the developed 
algorithms two approaches were selected: (i) multiple-hypothesis testing and (ii) neural networks; both 
used residuals from an Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) to detect the occurrence of the selected faults. A 
simple fusion algorithm was also implemented to combine the results from each algorithm to obtain an 
overall estimate of the identified fault type and magnitude. This fusion algorithm combined the 
complementary performances of the two algorithms to yield improved performances for HPC and HPT 
faults in comparison to either individual algorithm. Moreover, the fusion algorithm reduced the incidence 
of false alarms and miss-classified faults compared to either individual algorithm. The identification of the 
fault type and magnitude thus enabled the use of an online fault accommodation (FA) to correct for the 
adverse impact of these faults on the engine operability thereby enabling continued engine operation in 
the presence of these faults. FA restored thrust and component stall margin through control 
accommodation actions. We developed and implemented these fault detection and fault 
accommodation algorithms in a FADEC Simulation (FSIM) environment. Finally, we modified the 
implemented algorithms, especially the implementation of the EKF for fault detection and 
accommodation to address real-time implementation on the actual FADEC. The performance of the fault 
detection and accommodation algorithms were extensively tested with the high fidelity Cycle Workstation 
(CWS) model and simplified Component Level Model (CLM). 
2. Introduction 
2.1 Objective 
The goal of the Model-Based Fault Tolerant Control (MBFTC) program is to improve the operation of 
aircraft engines in the presence of faults or anomalous behavior, and increase overall aviation safety. 
In particular, the objective of the Phase II of the MBFTC program is 
 
1. To develop technologies for on-wing detection of critical faults in an aircraft engine system that 
may lead to in-flight shut downs (IFSD), aborted take-offs (ATO), asymmetric thrust/loss of 
thrust control (LOTC) or engine stall/surge.  
2. To automatically employ fault tolerant control to mitigate the adverse impact of identified faults, 
thereby allowing continued and safe operation of the engine and aircraft.  
3. To demonstrate the application of the developed model-based fault detection and 
accommodation technologies in a simulation/rig environment. 
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 2.2 Tasks 
This was a 4-year (2002–2005) MBFTC Phase II program continuing from MBFTC Phase I. In 
Phase I of the program, GEAE conducted a field event study and identified engine fault 
conditions, which have led to anomalous engine behavior. A single fault was then selected, 
modeled, and used for the simulation demonstration of a fault accommodating control strategy. 
This work was expanded to address additional faults, enhance the model-based diagnostic and 
control logic, and demonstrate the MBFTC technology on a ground-based (FADEC Simulation, 
FSIM) engine simulation using appropriate real-time engine models. To this end, the overall 
program was organized according to the following high-level tasks: 
 
Task 1—Engine Model Generation. This task entailed the development of a suitable real-time 
transient engine model to form the basis of MBFTC algorithms. Specifically, a component level 
model (CLM) was generated from a high-fidelity cycle workstation (CWS) model, which enabled 
the implementation and testing of developed MBFTC algorithms through simulations. 
Task 2—Engine Fault Selection and Modeling. This task entailed the identification of a few 
key engine sensor, actuator and gas path component faults based on historical data on the 
occurrence and significance of these faults. The identified faults were included in the engine 
model (CLM and CWS) to simulate the impact of these faults and enable MBFTC algorithm 
development and validation. 
Task 3—Robust Fault Tolerant Control Development. This is the core technical task that 
entailed (i) development of model-based fault detection algorithms for on-wing detection of 
selected faults, and (ii) development of fault tolerant control algorithms to adapt the existing 
FADEC logic to accommodate the identified fault, i.e., mitigate the adverse impact of the fault on 
engine operability and performance to enable continued and safe engine operation. 
Task 4—Demonstration of MBFTC Technology on a Relevant Test Environment. This task 
was to entail the maturation of the developed MBFTC algorithms and implementation on a test 
platform, i.e., a dry rig, with the developed algorithms running on a FADEC in real time. To this 
end, the developed algorithms were modified and implemented in a FADEC simulation (FSIM) 
environment with the CLM used to simulate the engine and actual FADEC software verified 
through closed-loop simulations. The FSIM implementation was modified to address 
computational limitations of the FADEC hardware towards real-time implementation. Due to 
facility access issues, the MBFTC algorithms were not tested in a dry rig environment. 
2.3 Report Layout 
This report is organized into individual sections documenting the technology development and 
results of this program for each task mentioned above. 
 
Section 3 describes the overall MBFTC approach developed and implemented in this program. 
Details of the specific elements in the MBFTC approach are provided in the subsequent 
sections. Section 4 discusses the two main models used in this program: (i) the high-fidelity 
cycle workstation (CWS) model, and (ii) component level model (CLM) simplified from the CWS 
model to enable real-time implementation as an embedded engine model. Section 5 describes 
the selection of the four key engine sensor, actuator and gas-path component faults addressed 
in this program, and modeling of these faults in the CWS and CLM. Section 6 describes the 
various model-based fault detection algorithms and their performance assessed through 
extensive CWS simulations. Section 7 describes the overall fault accommodation strategy and 
documents the results for fault accommodation for the selected faults through CWS simulations. 
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 Section 8 describes the implementation and validation of the developed models, model-based 
fault detection and fault accommodation algorithms in a FADEC simulation (FSIM) environment, 
and the modifications implemented to address real-time implementation issues for the FADEC 
hardware. Finally, section 9 concludes the results of this program, with some general thoughts 
on future directions/extension of the developed technology. 
3. Overall MBFTC Approach 
In this section, we present the overall MBFTC approach developed and implemented in this 
program for model-based detection and isolation of faults and automated fault accommodation 
based on the identified fault. It should be mentioned that the developed technology builds upon 
the existing FADEC logic that provides the nominal control logic for an un-faulted engine 
system. The developed approach modifies this existing FADEC logic upon identification of a 
fault to adapt the control logic for that particular identified fault.  
 
Figure 1 shows the overall MBFTC approach. The developed algorithms are implemented in the 
FADEC hardware on top of the existing FADEC logic for un-faulted engine. The new MBFTC 
technology elements for model-based fault detection and accommodation are highlighted with 
blue blocks. Specifically, the developed approach uses an Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) with 
an embedded engine model (CLM) to generate residuals for all sensed engine outputs. These 
sensor residuals from the EKF are then processed, by one or more fault detection algorithms, to 
detect and isolate the fault type, confidence and fault magnitude. The results from each 
individual fault detection algorithm are combined through a fusion algorithm to obtain the overall 
fault type, confidence and magnitude. Based on the identified fault type an appropriate 
accommodation strategy is employed. In particular, for non-sensor (engine/actuator) faults, 
optimum FADEC adjustments are evaluated through pre-computed look-up tables based on the 
fault type and magnitude and added to the baseline FADEC outputs (control actuator 
commands) for an un-faulted engine. The resulting net command for the control actuators is 
optimal for mitigating the adverse impact of the identified fault type and magnitude. On the other 
hand, for sensor faults, e.g., a pressure sensor fault, another EKF is used to optimally estimate 
the correct value from the remaining sensors and used in the existing FADEC logic instead of 
the faulty pressure sensor value. The details on the fault selection, modeling, fault detection and 

































Figure 1.—Overall MBFTC approach. 
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 4. Engine Models 
This section describes the transient engine models used in this program to develop and test the 
MBFTC algorithms for selected faults. In particular, we used two kinds of transient models (i) a 
high-fidelity cycle workstation model (CWS) and (ii) a component level model (CLM). While the 
CWS model is the highest-fidelity model available, it is computationally very intensive and not 
amenable to real-time implementations. Thus, the CWS model was simplified to generate a 
CLM that avoids expensive computations (e.g., iterative solutions) to enable real-time 
implementations with a minimal impact on simulation accuracy. The CWS model was used 
extensively to generate fault data used for development and testing of fault detection algorithms. 
The developed MBFTC algorithms used the CLM as an embedded engine model for online fault 
detection and accommodation. 
4.1 Cycle Workstation (CWS) Model 
The CWS model is a high-fidelity non-real-time model of the aircraft engine. It is a detailed 
physics-based transient model of the engine, and is validated against extensive engine data. 
While the CWS model is very accurate for steady state and transient simulation, its complexity 
prohibits real-time implementation. In particular, it involves an iterative solution of algebraic 
equations that is not amenable for real-time environments. The CWS model was used 
extensively in this program to generate data from nominal and faulted engines over the entire 
flight envelope, and this data was used to develop and validate the fault detection algorithms. In 
order to simulate the CWS with variation sources like engine-to-engine variation and engine 
degradation/deterioration, appropriate engine-to-engine variation and deterioration models were 
incorporated in the baseline CWS model. The following parameters are modified to simulate the 
effects of engine-to-engine variation in the engine. 
 
The existing deterioration model altered certain parameters including HPT scalers and adders. 
A more accurate model replaces the aforementioned variables and modifies the cold clearance 
to propagate deterioration through the gas path. The following variables are altered to simulate 
deterioration. 
 
Also, models for the selected faults were added to the CWS model to enable simulations with 
these faults—the fault models are described later in section 5. 
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Efficiency adder for fan DE13D 
Efficiency adder for booster DE23D 
HPC efficiency adder DE3D 
HPT efficiency adder DE42D 
LPT efficiency adder DE5D 
CDP Seal D3W0 
CDP Front Seal D3W42 
Fan Flow Scalar SW2AR 
Booster Flow Scalar SW2R 
HPC flow multiplier SW25R 
Delta Cold Clearance DTCLS1 
 
TABLE 2.—DETERIORATION PARAMETERS 
Description CWS Input 
HPC Efficiency DE3D 
LPT Efficiency DE5D 
HPC Flow Scalar SW25R 
Front Seal Flow Adder D3W0 
CDP Seal Flow Adder D3W42 
Cold clearance CLRC (1) 
Cold clearance CLRC (2) 
 
4.2 Component Level Model (CLM) 
Since the program is focused on model-based fault tolerant control, a model is at the heart of 
our control and detection algorithms. For this purpose we are using a component level model. 
The model used for this program is a nonlinear simulation of an advanced commercial high-
bypass twin-spool turbofan engine. This model can be run both in a transient and steady state 
modes. An interface from Matlab to call the CLM was created to enable rapid development and 
testing of the fault detection and accommodation algorithms. Some of the details of the model 
are described in the following sections. 
 
4.2.1 CLM Model Structure 






























Figure 2.—CLM inputs, parameters and sensors. 
 
 















where x is the states, z is the guesses, u is the inputs, and p are the health parameters.  
 
4.2.2 Inputs 
Table 3 describes the inputs needed to drive the model for transient and steady state operation.  
 




WF Fuel flow 
BV Bleed Valve 
VG Variable Geometry Guide Vanes 
ACC Clearance control 
ALT Altitude 
XM Free stream mach number 
DTAMB Deviation from iso standard day temperature 
 
4.2.3 States 
The CLM contains, as dynamic states, the speeds for low pressure (LP) and high pressure (HP) 
rotors, as well as heat soak metal temperatures in individual engine components, and metal 
temperatures for the thermal clearance model in the HP turbine. In addition to these states in 
the engine, there are dynamic lag states associated with the pressure and temperature sensors. 
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 4.2.4 Parameters 
Table 4 lists all of the health parameters that are used as inputs to the CLM. 
 
TABLE 4.—MODEL PARAMETERS 
 
Name Description 
SCLWF  Scalar multiplier for fuel flow 
SCLP2  Scalar multiplier for P2 measurement 
DE13D  Efficiency adder for fan 
SW12R  Flow multiplier for fan 
DE23D  Efficiency adder for booster 
SW2R Flow multiplier for booster 
DE3D  HPC efficiency adder 
SW25R HPC flow multiplier 
DE42D  HPT efficiency adder 
SW41R  HPT flow multiplier 
DE5D  LPT efficiency adder 
SW49R  LPT flow multiplier 
4.2.5 Sensors 
The engine has a total of 9 sensors, including the 2 rotor speeds and pressures and 
temperatures at different points in the engine. The CLM includes these sensors as outputs. 
 
4.2.6 CLM Solver  
The guesses (z) are due to the algebraic loops inside of the CLM and the values can be 
calculated using methods like Newton-Raphson (what GEAE calls SLAM) or approximations 
using a constant matrix (what GEAE calls xiiter). The top level Newton-Raphson method is 
shown in equation (2). Here the function is linearized about zn and a Newton step is 
accomplished to determine the new value of the guess at zn+1. Using SLAM this process is 
continued until the value of the error term (yr) is within some tolerance. For this model the CLM 
is using xiiter, which is a non-iterative approximation to SLAM. Instead of re-linearizing or 
determining the sensitivities at each point a constant matrix L is used for all points, and instead 
of continuing the iteration until the tolerance is below some pre-specified value the CLM uses 
only a single (or small user defined number (parameter nxiter in the CLM)) iteration. Both of 





























 4.2.7 Linearization 
For the MBFTC algorithms developed in this program, a linear state space model of the system 
is required, which can be obtained by linearizing the nonlinear CLM. However, problems arise 
with getting the linearized state-space (SS) model and calculating gain matrices due to the 
presence of the algebraic equations and variables (guesses) besides the standard state 
differential equations. The linearization approach needs to account for these algebraic 
equations to obtain a correct linear SS model. Two methods have been developed to create a 
linear model on-line at each time sample that addresses this issue in different manners. 
Approach #2 was selected as the method to use going forward with the program.  
4.2.7.1 Linearization—Approach #1 
In this approach, the linear SS model is obtained by directly perturbing the states x, the inputs u, 
and the parameters p one at a time. During each of the calls to the CLM with these 
perturbations, this approach relies on the model to solve for the guesses (z’s) correctly to keep 
the residuals of algebraic equations at 0. Accuracy problems occurred for this method if we only 
used one xiiter iteration (parameter nxiter in the CLM), since one iteration was insufficient to 
correctly update the z’s for each perturbation. We had to do between 40 to 100 iterations for 
each state and input to get an accurate result. This results in very long computation time for the 
creation of the linear models.  
 
























αLinearization at a SS testpoint 
Solution for Z (guesses) 
implemented by the model 
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 4.2.7.2 Linearization—Approach #2 
The second approach involves linearizing the system with respect to the algebraic equations 
and variables (guesses) as well, and obtaining the linearized SS model by solving the linearized 
equations for the algebraic variables (guesses). Since the algebraic equations are also 
linearized in this approach, xiiter is in fact disabled to disable updates in the algebraic variables 
(guesses z’s). Thus, this approach is much more computationally efficient. 
 
Again, the state space linear model is determined by perturbing x, u, p, and in this case z as 
well using central differencing. Then the guesses (z) are solved for explicitly from the linearized 
algebraic equations and substituted back into the xdot and y (output) equations resulting in 
linear models that are functions of x, u, and p. Figure 4 details the development of the state 
space linear model using approach #2. It was found that approach #2 is more accurate and 
faster computationally so it was selected as the linearization process going forward with this 
program. 
4.2.8 Variation, Deterioration, Bias, Noise 
This section will discuss the various aspects of the engine operation that vary either between 
engines, as engines age, or through the measurement processes.  
4.2.8.1 Engine-to-Engine Variation 
An engine-to-engine variation model was created for the engine model. The engine-to-engine 
variation accounts for manufacturing and assembly variation found in new engines. These 
variations can be described or modeled by adding normally distributed variation to the engine 
component health parameters listed in table 4. 
4.2.8.2 Deterioration 
A deterioration model was created for the engine model. After evaluating analytic engine 
teardowns, production test data, development test data, and overhaul engine findings it was 


















































 TABLE 5.—DETERIORATION MODEL PARAMETERS 
Description CLM input Units 
HPC Efficiency DE3D pts 
HPT Efficiency DE42D pts 
LPT Efficiency DE5D pts 
HPC Flow Scalar SW25R % 
HPT Flow Scalar SW41R % 
LPT Flow Scalar SW49R % 
Front Seal G3W0 %W25 
CDP Seal Distress G3W42 %W25 
LPT Aft brush seal G27W5 %W25 
 
4.2.9 Sensor Accuracy 
There are several factors that affect the measurement accuracy of any given sensor. Factors 
considered here are: 
 
1. Signal conditioning—accounts for excitation, A/D conversion, filtering, 
2. Sensor bias—accounts for sensor to sensor variation, 
3. Profile error—accounts for radial and circumferential variation in the measured 
parameters, 
4. Noise—accounts for noise in the system. 
 
Figure 5 shows a diagram of a generic measurement system in a gas turbine to illustrate how 
the different components of the system are related and how each of the factors affecting 





























 5. Fault Selection and Modeling 
In this section, we document the selection of the four key sensor/actuator/engine component 
faults and their modeling in the CWS and CLM models.  
5.1 Fault Selection 
The purpose is to identify, and ultimately select, faults that are relevant for the MBFTC program. 
To this end, it was imperative to determine the potential faults that can be considered in that 
context and to which degree they are relevant to the safety of aircraft operation. 
5.1.1 Selected Faults 
A list of fault candidates for the propulsion system was generated, and the faults were grouped 
at a high level into six categories including actuator, FADEC, fuel system, gas path, oil system, 
and sensors. For this program, we are interested in the Actuator, Gas Path Turbomachinery, 
and Sensor system categories. The faults that were selected for consideration in the AvSSP 
program are: 
 
1. Variable Geometry guide vanes (VG) – Actuators, 
2. HPC Damage – Gas Path, 
3. HPT Damage – Gas Path, 
4. PS3 Pressure Sensor – Sensors. 
 
Figure 6 shows the overall structure of selected faults in the engine-control system. 
5.2 Modeling of Selected Faults 
In this section, we describe in more detail the type of fault considered for each of the 
sensor/actuator/turbo-machinery fault types and their modeling in CWS and CLM models. 
 
5.2.1 Variable Geometry (VG) Fault 
For the variable geometry guide vanes, position errors and other losses of system actuation 
account for the majority of the system failures. The remaining faults result from localized failures 
at individual lever arm/vane sites. Since the lever arm failures would require three dimensional 
flow models to characterize and our current VG model is a lumped system level model, we 
cannot model the lever arm failures and excluded them from this project. The VG position error 
failures are modeled as a steady in-range bias and a drifting in-range bias. Table 6 shows the 




Figure 6.—Fault block diagram. 
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5.2.2 HPC/HPT Fault 
 
The HPC and HPT faults were modeled as changes in the corresponding component’s 
efficiency adders and flow scalers. While on the GE military engine Survivable Engine Controls 
Algorithm Development (SECAD) program a large damage was considered of the order of 25% 
reduction in efficiency, for a commercial engine program a large efficiency reduction is on the 
order of 3 to 5%. Table 7 shows the damage models for small, medium, and large HPC and 
HPT faults. 
 
TABLE 7.—HPC AND HPT FAULT MODEL PARAMETERS 
CLM Small Medium Large
inputs Fault Fault Fault
Efficiency DE3D -1.50% -3% -5%
Flow SW25R -1.50% -3% -5%
Efficiency DE42D -1.50% -3% -5%





5.2.3 PS3 Pressure Sensor Fault 
 
A primary fault mode for the PS3 pressure sensor is a leak. The PS3 pressure sensor leak fault 
is modeled as a negative bias on the sensor output compared to the true value, and the model 
values for small, medium and large faults are given in table 8. 
 
TABLE 8.—PRESSURE SENSOR FAULT MODELS 
Small Medium Large
Pressure Bias (%) 2.33 6.67 10.00  
 
6. Model-Based Fault Detection 
In this section, we describe the development and testing of fault detection algorithms for the four 
selected faults.  
6.1 Fault Data Generation  
We generated extensive data using the CWS/CLM models for engines with and without the 
selected faults. Initially, we generated data in the so-called “open-loop” setup where the control 
actuators were held constant at values for an un-faulted engine, despite the presence of a fault. 
However, this is not realistic since the FADEC logic does respond to a fault and consequently 
the control actuators vary with time. To capture this aspect, we re-generated the data in “closed-
loop” setup allowing the FADEC to respond to the fault and vary the control actuators in a 
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 closed-loop configuration. In all we generated an extensive set of Monte Carlo simulations to 
reflect the presence of various sources of variation, and the presence of faults or different types 
and magnitudes. In all simulation runs, we initialized the engine at a steady-state point, and then 
injected a random fault type and magnitude, and simulate until reaching a new steady state 
corresponding to the particular fault. 
 
6.1.1 Open-Loop Setup 
We generated extensive data for an engine in the presence of variation arising from 
• TRA, Alt, XM, DTAMB (point in flight envelope) 
• Engine-to-Engine Variation 
• Engine deterioration 
• Sensor noise 
for an un-faulted engine as well as a faulted engine for each combination of the four selected 
fault types and small, medium, large magnitude. To this end, initially, we ran the true engine in 
the so-called “open-loop” mode. More specifically, the true engine (CWS model) was run to 
steady-state conditions in a set of Monte Carlo runs in the presence of above-mentioned 
variation, but without any fault. For each case, the control actuators were then fixed and a 
random fault type and magnitude combination was injected to generate the full Monte Carlo 
simulation with 13 cases (1 no fault case + 12 cases with combinations of 4 fault types and 3 
fault magnitudes). This data was then processed through an Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) 
using the CLM as the embedded engine model; the embedded CLM was set to correspond to a 
half-deteriorated engine to reflect the average engine over the entire fleet. The overall structure 
of this “open-loop” data generation setup is shown in figure 7. However, we realized that this 
data was not entirely correct, since it did not include the “closed-loop” response of the faulted 


























Figure 7.—Open-loop fault data generation setup. 
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 6.1.2 Closed-Loop Setup 
To more accurately reflect the fact that in the presence of a fault, the FADEC logic will respond 
to the impact of the fault on the sensed outputs, we re-generated the data in “closed-loop” 
configuration as shown in figure 8. In this closed-loop configuration, we ran a Monte Carlo 
simulation with 13 cases (1 no-fault case plus 12 cases with combinations of the 4 fault types 
and 3 fault magnitudes), with 2047 runs for each case reflecting random combinations of 
engine-to-engine variation (normally distributed variation of component health parameters listed 
in table 1), engine deterioration (uniformly distributed variation of component health parameters 
listed in table 5), and flight conditions (Alt, XM, DTAMB, TRA) over the flight envelope as shown 



























Figure 8.—Closed-loop fault data generation setup. 
 
 
Figure 9.—Flight envelope points in fault data generation. 
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 The generated data and the EKF residuals for each of these Monte Carlo runs were used to 
develop and test the performance of the fault detection algorithms. 
6.2 Extended Kalman Filter 
As mentioned before in section 3 and section 6.1, the model-based fault detection algorithms 
rely on using an Extended Kalman Filter to generate residuals for all sensed outputs, i.e., the 
mismatch between measured values and EKF estimates, which reflect the presence or absence 
of a fault. In particular, the fault detection has to be performed in the presence of variations 
arising from (i) flight conditions over the flight envelope, (ii) engine-to-engine variation, (iii) 
engine deterioration, and (iv) sensor noise. The use of a nonlinear embedded model (CLM) and 
the EKF accounts for the nonlinearities over the entire flight envelope. However, in this program, 
we are not adapting the embedded engine model (CLM) to match a specific engine, i.e., 
account for engine-to-engine variation and deterioration. Thus, the embedded engine model 
uses fixed health parameters corresponding to an average engine in the fleet, i.e., a half-
deteriorated engine to avoid any systematic bias in the residuals. The residuals will have a non-
zero mean and variance arising due to the un-matched model (engine-to-engine variation and 
deterioration). In the presence of a fault in the true engine, the residuals will vary in a manner 
dependent on the fault type and magnitude, thereby allowing the detection and isolation of the 
fault type and magnitude. 
 
6.2.1 EKF implementation 
The EKF is based on the Component-Level Model (CLM). This model is parameterized by 













The constrained state variables, z, are defined implicitly by the second equation. Thus, the state 
equation is continuous-time, is in descriptor form and is inherently nonlinear. The output 
equation also is nonlinear. 
 
 ).,,,( ttttt puzxhy =  (4) 
 
The state, x, comprises the spool speeds and heat soak temperatures followed by many 
clearance model states and a few sensor states. In final implementations of the EKF, we 
implement a reduced-order EKF estimating only 9 states, excluding any heat soak, clearance 
model and sensor lag states that are un-observable or have too fast dynamics. 
 
The input, u, has five parts: 7 “guesses” for z, 3 unused elements, 4 control inputs, the 
environmental variables of altitude, mach number and ambient temperature, and the set of 
12 parameters.  
 
The CLM output, y, contains many intermediate variables, the three environmental variables, 




 The parameter vector, p, contains the coefficients representing the engine wear state. This 
should capture the engine deterioration and the engine-to-engine variability. As mentioned 
above, these parameters are set to correspond to a half-deteriorated engine for the embedded 
CLM used in the EKF. 
 
For the purposes of the EKF, we shall run the CLM in discrete time, with time index .dtkt =  
The time-update section of the EKF is given in standard form for the x-part of the equations 
 
 ).,,ˆ,ˆ(ˆˆ ||||1 kkkkkkkkkk puzxfdtxx +=+  (5) 
 
Here we have used Euler integration to move from continuous to discrete time. 
 
To derive the update formula for the z-part of the state, we use a Newton-Raphson iteration to 























This results in the same algorithm as the alternative approach of attempting to keep z on the 
manifold defined by the constraint as x updates. This latter approach presumes that the 

























































































The preference for the former derivation lies in its not assuming the constraint satisfaction and 
its clear connection to the Newton-Raphson method to minimize the deviation from the 
constraint. The g terms are the residuals representing the error in constraint satisfaction. 
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 The measurement update section requires the linearized model for the computation of the Σ-
matrix using the partial derivatives 
 





∂=  (8) 
 
[Note the differing indices on the state estimate arguments in these two terms.] 
























































In the global scheme of the EKF, one should also consider updating the constrained states to 
produce kkz |ˆ  from kkx |ˆ  and 1|ˆ −kkz . However, in place of the linearized approach of EKF, we 
prefer to rely on the Newton-Raphson step above as the only adjustment. To do more would 
require computation of more terms such as ( )kkkkkk puzxg ,,ˆ,ˆ 1|| −  and a new derivative term. We 
shall rely on a single Newton update stage and take 1|| ˆˆ −= kkkk zz . 
 
In summary, the EKF algorithm implemented is as follows. 
 






























































( ).),,ˆ,ˆ(ˆˆ 1|1|1|| kkkkkkkkkkkk puzxhyKxx −−− −+=  
 
The central approximations made are in the computation of derivatives only at one point and the 
single Newton-Raphson correction of the constrained states, z. 
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 6.2.2 EKF Design for Fault Detection 
The ideal residuals for a given fault type and magnitude would all be “large”, i.e., distinguishable 
from a no-fault case, and lay on top of each other with very little variation. In addition, the 
residuals should be “different” for different types of faults and fault magnitudes to enable fault 
detection and isolation. However, the presence of engine-to-engine variation and deterioration 
in the true engine causes an engine-model mismatch (the embedded engine model in EKF uses 
a fixed set of health parameters) that leads to non-zero residuals even in the un-faulted case. 
This undesired variation in the EKF residuals masks the residuals corresponding to an actual 
fault, thereby making the fault detection and isolation difficult. Figure 10 shows the residuals for 
nine sensors for closed-loop data with a large HPT fault. These results are the baseline before 
doing any development to optimize the EKF tuning and generate residuals correlated with fault 
type and magnitude. Clearly, the sensor residuals are not very structured and have significant 
variability despite a fixed fault type (HPC) and fault magnitude (large). 
 
Figure 11 shows an example set of fan speed sensor residuals in a specific location in the flight 
envelope for HPT fault. In particular, the four subplots to the left show the residuals for no fault 
(labeled as level 0) and small, medium and large faults labeled as levels 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively. All these 4 cases are plotted together in the subplot on the right side. It is clear, 
that there is no systematic pattern in the residual correlated with the presence and magnitude of 








Figure 11.—EKF residuals in N1 sensor for HPT fault before optimal design. 
 
As we stated, residuals corresponding to a given fault type and magnitude should all be “large” 
and lay on top of each other with very little variation, irrespective of flight conditions, engine-to-
engine variations and deterioration. In addition, residuals should be different for different types 
of faults and magnitudes to allow fault isolation and identification of the fault magnitude. Note 
that the isolation of the fault type and fault magnitude is critical in enabling a correct fault 
accommodation. For the un-optimized EKF, the residuals do not show these desirable features 
due to the random engine-to-engine variation and deterioration we put into the closed-loop CWS 
runs when generating the fault data. Therefore, our goal now is to redesign the EKF to make it: 
 
• Less sensitive to deterioration and engine-to-engine variation, and  
• More sensitive to faults.  
 
The EKF was optimized to meet the above objectives. The results of the residuals obtained with 
the optimally designed EKF are shown in figure 12. Clearly, we see large residuals in specific 
sensors for the large HPT fault, with small variation in these residuals despite variation from 
engine-to-engine variation and engine deterioration. 
Figure 13 shows an example set of fan speed sensor residuals for HPC faults of different 
magnitudes in a specific section of the flight envelope, obtained by this optimally designed EKF. 
Clearly, it is apparent that the residuals for no fault case (blue) is zero mean and has a small 
variance, while the residuals for small, medium and large HPC faults show a systematic trend 
associated with the fault magnitude, as desired. 
6.3 Fault Detection Algorithms 
In this section, we describe the multiple fault detection algorithms that were developed in this 
program. These methods: 
 
1. Crisp Rule (or abrupt change detection) method 
2. Neural Network, 
3. Rapid Fault detection 
4. Multiple Hypothesis Testing 
 
with the exception of the first method, rely on analyzing the EKF residuals obtained from the 
EKF described in the previous section, to detect and isolate a fault. The individual algorithms 
are described in detail in the following sections. 
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 .  
Figure 12.—EKF residuals for one regime for large HPT faults after optimal design. 
 
 
Figure 13.—EKF residuals in N1 sensor for HPC fault after optimal design. 
 
6.3.1 Crisp-Rule Classification 
Even quite subtle faults can be detected given enough time; however, for fault accommodation, 
faults generally need to be detected in a minimum amount of time. Thus, fault detection is a 
tradeoff between detection time and accuracy. Techniques that take a long time have a much 
higher criterion for classification accuracy, while techniques that are very fast necessarily have 
some tolerance for misclassification between faults. Crisp rule (cf. fuzzy rule) classification 
(CRC), is designed to use a fixed set of rules to detect faults quickly, with a bias toward 
classifying faults either correctly or as nominal (i.e., rather than misclassifying them as another 
fault), and with no tolerance for false alarms.  
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 This approach operates on the raw sensed data (i.e., it relies on neither the model nor the EKF). 
The idea is to compare the sensed values from the current time step to the sensed values in the 
interval from two to three seconds ago1.  
 
The data are z-transformed, using the mean and standard deviation from the data in the interval 






The z transformation removes any engine variation, deterioration and flight envelope effects, 
leaving only sensor noise (with unit variation across all sensors) and the effect of faults in the 
data.  
 
Figure 14, shows the performance of the fault detection using the closed-loop fault data. 
 
 
VG Fault P Sensor Fault
 
Figure 14.—Percent of faults correctly classified as a function of time for the closed-loop data. 
                                                
1This particular window was chosen to reflect the faults in this study, but it is not inherent to the technique – a longer 
or shorter window will detect faults with slower or quicker onset, respectively 
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 This method is very simple in that it is designed to detect rapid changes in the engine sensors at 
a steady-state operating condition, arising due to the faults. Clearly, the method relies heavily 
on understanding the precise mechanism for the onset of a fault, i.e., how fast or slowly it is 
manifested. Moreover, the rules for processing these rapid changes in the sensors and 
identifying/isolating a particular fault type are determined through manual inspection of the fault 
data. Finally, this method offers no measure of certainty (a fault is either detected, or it is not) or 
the magnitude of the fault.  
 
6.3.2 Neural Network Classification 
To address some of the potential limitations of the very fast detection algorithms, several “slow” 
algorithms were developed which detect the fault based on the nature of the residuals several 
seconds after the fault. Unlike the fast detection approaches, these approaches do not rely on 
the fault onset being modeled precisely. Thus, if the fast algorithms miss a fault because it 
evolves in a way that was not modeled during the development of the fast algorithms, one of the 
slow algorithms, which are tuned based on the steady-state effect of the faults, may detect it. 
The slow detection algorithm described in this section relies on neural networks for fault 
identification.  
 
An artificial neural network (NN) is a biologically inspired system that attempts to mimic, in a 
greatly simplified manner, the function of the brain. A neural network is composed of neurons 
(also referred to as nodes). A neuron has one or more inputs (X1…Xn), which are modified by 
the corresponding weights (w1… wn). The product of the inputs and weights are summed 
(represented by the Σ), along with the bias (b, a constant), and evaluated by a typically 
nonlinear transfer function (represented by the ∫); the result is the output, y. Mathematically, a 







y b w x
=
⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑∫ . 
 
All of the neural networks used here employ the hyperbolic tangent sigmoid transfer function: 
 





−= +∫ .  
 
Individual neurons are arranged in layers to form a network, typically comprised of an input 
layer, one or two hidden layers, and an output layer. For example, the NN in figure 16 has an 
unspecified number (n) of inputs, five neurons in the first hidden layer, three neurons in the 
second hidden layer, and two output neurons (corresponding to the two outputs, y1 and y2).  
 
The process of determining the weights and biases is known as training. A series of patterns is 
evaluated by the network, and the weights and biases are adjusted using Bayesian 
regularization backpropagation2 so as to minimize the error between the predicted value and the 
desired value, but not over fit the training data (i.e., to generalize well).  
 
                                                
2For details, see: 
Foresee, F.D., and M.T. Hagan, "Gauss-Newton approximation to Bayesian regularization," Proceedings of the 1997 
International Joint Conference on Neural Networks, 1997.  






































Figure 16.—A NN with n inputs, five neurons in the first hidden layer, three neurons in the second hidden 
layer, and two output neurons (corresponding to the two outputs, y1 and y2). The bias for each neuron 
is not shown. 
 
A neural network fault detection system was developed, operating on the EKF residuals (with 
EKF bias removed). The mean of a subset of the sensed data a few seconds after fault onset, 
as well as flight envelope information (mach number, ambient temperature, throttle angle, and 
altitude) was used as network inputs. There were seven neurons in the single hidden layer, and 
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 five neurons in the output layer. All the EKF generated residual input data was normalized such 
that it ranged from –1 to 1. The data was split into two groups, with 85% of the data used to train 
the network, and 15% of the data used to validate the network.  
 
Each of the five output neurons corresponds to one of the four fault types, plus the nominal 
condition. The output for each neuron was 1 if the case corresponded to the neuron type (e.g., 
VG fault), or –1 otherwise. The case is assigned the fault type (or nominal condition) 
corresponding to the neuron with the largest value above a threshold.  
 
The results of the NN detection system at the end of each run are presented in table 9. Note 
that 99.9% of all faults are correctly classified at the end of the run, with no false alarms, and 
only a few misclassifications.  
 
 
TABLE 9.—RESULTS FOR VALIDATION DATA FOR NEURAL 
NETWORK CLASSIFIER 
Ove ra ll
Fault HP C HP T V S V P S 3 Nom
HP C 893 2 0 0 0
HP T 1 992 0 0 0
V S V 0 0 954 0 0
P S 3 0 0 0 971 0
Nom 0 0 0 0 325
S m a ll
Fault HP C HP T V S V P S 3 Nom
HP C 271 0 0 0 0
HP T 1 324 0 0 0
V S V 0 0 324 0 0
P S 3 0 0 0 325 0
Nom 0 0 0 0 325
M e dium
Fault HP C HP T V S V P S 3 Nom
HP C 318 1 0 0 0
HP T 0 351 0 0 0
V S V 0 0 320 0 0
P S 3 0 0 0 326 0
Nom 0 0 0 0 325
La rge
Fault HP C HP T V S V P S 3 Nom
HP C 304 1 0 0 0
HP T 0 317 0 0 0
V S V 0 0 310 0 0
P S 3 0 0 0 320 0
Nom 0 0 0 0 325
Clas s ific ation
Clas s ific ation
Clas s ific ation






















Figure 17.—Accuracy of fault magnitude estimator. Small faults were assigned 
a value of 1, medium faults a value of 2 and large faults a value of 3. 
 
In addition to the identification and classification of the faults, another neural network was also 
trained to identify the fault magnitude. This second network uses a subset of the transformed 
sensed variables as well as flight envelope information (mach number, ambient temperature, 
throttle angle, and altitude) as inputs, has two hidden layers with 17 and 13 nodes, respectively, 
and one output i.e., the fault magnitude. Figure 17 is a plot of the accuracy of the NN fault 
magnitude estimator, which is quite good. 
 
Some advantages to this detection system are that, because of the encoding system, it allows 
for both a positive nominal and, conversely, for the detection of faults of an unknown type. That 
is, if the nominal condition is indicated, it is likely that the engine is truly nominal; conversely, if 
the value of the nominal neuron output does not reach the threshold, but none of the other 
neurons reach the threshold as well, then a fault of unknown nature is detected. Moreover, the 
closeness of the dominant output value to 1 provides an indication of the confidence in the fault 
type – a feature that can be used to fuse the results from other fault detection/classification 
results and get an improved overall detection/classification performance.  
6.3.3 Rapid Fault Detections  
This method was designed and tested only using the initially generated “open-loop” fault data. 
Based on considerations of maturity of this approach relative to the others, we did not pursue it 
when we regenerated the “closed-loop” data. In this section, we describe the general approach 
and its results for the “open-loop” data only. 
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 Detection accuracy of engine faults is typically predicated by the magnitude of the fault 
signature seen in sensor measurements and time to detection. That is, typically, fault detection 
assumes a sufficiently large fault signature and enough time to come up with the decision. In 
addition, noise, engine-to-engine variation, deterioration, model uncertainty, and closed loop 
controller effects further encumber the detection algorithms. Because we need to support 
automatic fault accommodation, another requirement imposed on the detection includes a zero 
false positive rate to avoid taking remedial action when no fault exists. It is therefore imperative 
to remove as much noise as possible within the allowed detection interval.  
 
To allow for the detection of small changes in engine components, a suite of techniques was 
employed to address certain aspects of these issues in parallel. Since emphasis was placed on 
the quick detection, feature extraction underwent special attention. First, the effects of fault 
signature variability of the tracking residuals due to operating conditions were investigated using 
a generic baselining approach. In addition, several advanced features were developed that 
indicate a deviation from normal operation including some techniques that are more commonly 
found in data trending. Finally, a bank of binary classifiers determines the presence of the fault 
as resolved by a maximum likelihood hypothesis test. We show performance results for four 
different faults at various levels of severity (small, medium, and high) at steady state with no 
change in actuator inputs or flight conditions and continuously for several seconds after fault 
introduction.  
 
In support of the rapid detection, we introduce here an elbowing operator that responds to 
abnormal changes. Because changes do not to show up as a step change, the detection is 
encumbered. This is true for most measured parameters because mechanical and 
thermodynamical inertia acts as a dampening agent such that changes come to light with some 
lag only. What hampers reliable early recognition further is the noise in the system, which is the 
primary potential source for false-positives. It is vital to find the point at which the change may 
have been initiated. Traditional regression techniques do not do well because only a few data 
points are available for the change detection and small changes are drowned in the noise. That 
in turn may result in drastically different regression results as well as very unreliable 
determination of the elbow point. Generally these techniques can be found within the trending 
domain where similar problems of quick detection occur (although the sampling time may be off 
by several orders of magnitude). To address quick-change recognition, we carry out a quasi-
sliding hypothesis test that evaluates whether a change over a window of observations meets 
certain change criteria. These criteria are based on change persistence as well as change 
magnitude. If these criteria are met, an “elbow” point, i.e., the point at which the potential 
change has first occurred, is identified and retained. The difference between the elbow point 
and the current smoothed observation is then used as a feature for the classifier. The window 
size for smoothing is determined by the time to detection requirements. One advantage of this 
feature is that it is always baselined to 0 because it operates on the differences only. The 
operative equation for the elbowing variable x(k) is 
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 ( ) ( )( ), ( 1), ( 2), ( 3), ( 4)m k mean res k res k res k res k res k= − − − − ( ) ( ) ( )ˆres k y k y k= −  
 
kelbow is the time at which elbowing was observed 
dth is the threshold for elbowing 
 
Figure 18 shows the temperature residual and corresponding elbowing where the fault was 
injected at time t = 60. 
 
The overall classification approach followed the scheme shown in figure 19. Inputs are the flight 
envelope data (FE data), sensor data, and EKF estimates. After a preliminary variable selection, 
residuals are computed from which further features are calculated including the elbowing 
features. After a further feature selection process, the features are subjected to the classification 
(here multiple binary classification). The classifiers were trained as binary classifiers using the 
fault data as one class and the normal and other fault classes as the other class. The last step 
is the hypothesis test, which selects the final fault state.  
 
 















Figure 18.—Small HPT fault example; (a) 























Figure 19.—Fault classification scheme. 
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 Following are a number of Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves that summarize fault 
specific results. Because performance is generally good, we show only a small portion of the 
ROC curve from the true positive (TP) point where the false positive (FP) rate was zero. This 
means that the axes of the curves are different in the cases presented to provide a better 
appreciation of the performance. 
 
The ROC in figure 20 shows the results for detection of an HPC fault. For a false positive rate of 
zero, the true negative (TN) rate is 0.998. The somewhat choppy line is due to the number of 
cases used, which at this level of granularity is not sufficient to provide a smooth curve. 
 
The ROC in figure 21 shows the results for HPT fault. For a false positive rate of zero, the TN 






































Figure 21.—ROC curve for HPT fault classification. 
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Figure 22.—ROC curve for VG fault classification. 
 
 













Figure 23.—ROC curve for pressure sensor fault classification. 
 
 
The VG fault results are shown in figure 22. For a zero false positive rate, the corresponding TN 
rate is 0.953.  
 
For zero false positives for the pressure sensor fault, the TN rate is 0.52. Figure 23 shows the 
associated ROC. 
 
One of the main distinctions of this study is that results are compiled for faults that can occur at 
any point in the flight envelope with any level of noise and engine deterioration. With the 
mandated zero false positive rate (to avoid any un-commanded accommodation), results are 
still very reasonable as shown in table 10, which shows the confusion matrix for the output of 
the maximum likelihood fault selection logic with sensor residuals alone.  
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 TABLE 10.—CONFUSION MATRIX FOR RAPID DETECTION OF SELECTED 
FAULTS (FP FORCED TO ZERO)—SENSORS ONLY 
 No fault HPC HPT VG PS3 
sensor 
No fault 1 0 0 0 0 
HPC 0.200 0.799 0.001 0 0 
HPT 0.166 0.009 0.825 0 0 
VG 0.152 0 0 0.848 0 
PS3 sensor 0.480 0 0 0 0.520 
 
The performance improves considerably over the detection with sensor measurements alone 
when the elbowing feature is used as well. Results are summarized in the confusion matrix in 
table 11. Specifically, all faults are detected at zero false positive levels upward of 90%, where 
in particular the P sensor fault improved from 0.52 to 0.951 TP rate. At the same time, all falsely 
classified faults drop considerably. In both cases, only HPT and HPC faults are misclassified. If 
accommodation mandates that no misclassifications be made at all, then the results will 
deteriorate considerably because the particular combination of deterioration, flight envelope, 
and fault signature are completely overlapping. However, the misclassifications occur in large 
part only at the smallest fault level with very few misclassifications at the medium fault level and 
no misclassifications at the large fault level. That also implies that larger faults can be 
accommodated safely. Results for that case are summarized in table 11. 
 
TABLE 11.—CONFUSION MATRIX FOR RAPID DETECTION OF SELECTED FAULTS 
(FP FORCED TO ZERO) WITH ELBOW FEATURE 
 No fault 
est. 
HPC est. HPT est. VG est. PS3 
sensor 
est. 
No fault 1 0 0 0 0 
HPC 0.036 0.959 0.005 0 0 
HPT 0.041 0.007 0.952 0 0 
VG 0.090 0 0 0.910 0 
PS3 
sensor 
0.049 0 0 0 0.951 
 
Figure 24 shows the individual fault indicators as well as the overall fault indicator for HPC fault. 
At time t = 0.5s, an HPC fault is injected. It can be seen that the fault indicator shows the 
presence of the fault within the desired time window, with some chattering. 
 
Figure 25 shows a VG fault injected at 0.5 s. It is notable that the detection commences rapidly 
within only a few samples and well within the required detection interval.  
 
Figure 26 shows the effect of fault size on detection capability. The three graphs show a small, 
medium, and large pressure sensor fault. In this particular instance, a fault at a point in the flight 
envelope with noise conditions was chosen for display that could not be picked up for small 
faults because it falls under the detection threshold. Medium and large faults are detected as 
seen in the second and third graph. Not surprisingly, fault magnitude seems to have a strong 
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Figure 26.—Effect of fault size on detection capability: 




 6.3.4 Multiple Hypothesis Testing  
In this section, we describe the “multiple hypothesis testing” method that we have developed to 
detect all four faults for the VG, HPC, HPT, and PS3 sensor failures. 
 
In this approach, the various fault types and levels, as well as the no-fault condition, are 
expressed in terms of their signatures in a “measurement space” defined by the EKF residuals. 
This space is of dimension p, corresponding to the number of sensors. The values attained by 
the residuals when the various fault conditions are imposed are thus represented as positions in 
the space, and these positions are compared to real-time measurements to assess the health of 
the engine. 
 
Because the sensors are subject to noise and unknown biases, the fault conditions actually give 
rise not to discrete positions in the measurement space, but rather to probabilistic distributions 
in the space. More precisely, these are conditional probability functions defined on the p-
dimensional space, given the various fault hypotheses. If the sensor noise is considered to be 
Gaussian, white, and hypothesis-independent, the fault hypotheses may be represented as 
uniform ellipsoidal functions centered on various mean positions in the space, with the axes of 
the ellipsoid sized according to the noise variance in each dimension. 
 
Under a further assumption of independence among the sensors, it is customary to normalize 
the component dimensions of the measurement space by the standard deviation of the 
corresponding sensor noise, so that the ellipsoidal probability density functions degenerate to 
spherical functions of uniform radius, and the hypotheses are distinguished solely by the 
locations of their correspondingly normalized, vector-valued means. Further, in the absence of 
a-priori knowledge of engine faults, the various fault hypotheses are assumed to be equally 
likely over a given time interval. 
 
Under the full set of assumptions outlined above, the implementation of an optimal Bayesian 
Hypothesis test that minimizes the probability of error (false positives, false negatives, and 
misclassifications) can accomplished by a relatively simple computation. Namely, a distance, in 
the standard Euclidean sense, is computed between the real-time instantaneous value of the 
residuals and the various p-dimensional reference hypotheses, after dividing each residual 
component by the standard deviation of the sensor noise; the hypothesis with the smallest 
distance gives the “maximum likelihood” and is chosen as the result. This simplified approach is 
possible because the conditional probabilities can be expressed as monotonically decreasing 
functions of distance alone. 
 
If one or more of the assumptions on sensor noise—namely whiteness, Gaussian distribution, 
fault-independence, and independence across sensors—does not hold, the method of Bayesian 
hypothesis testing remains applicable, though its implementation becomes more complex. 
Generally, what is required in such cases is the more computationally expensive direct 
computation of the conditional probabilities.  
 
One of the challenges encountered in applying the described method to fault estimation in 
aircraft engines is compensating for unmodeled variations due to deterioration, engine-to-engine 
variation, and sensor accuracy bias. To mitigate this, we implemented a straightforward, slowly 
updating bias estimator that determines the DC component of the difference between the 
engine output and the EKF output, i.e., the EKF residuals. Figure 27 shows where in the 
detection algorithm the computed bias is removed.  
 
Figures 28 and 29 show the effect of removing the bias for data obtained at a representative 
operating point within the flight envelope. 
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Figure 27.—Engine model and EKF, showing location of bias removal. 
 
 
Without bias removal With bias removed 
 
 





Figure 29.—Histograms of sensor residuals for nominal case, before and after bias removal. 
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 Figure 30 depicts the overall training and implementation phases of the hypothesis testing 
approach. The estimator is first trained offline with the engine model (bottom of figure) to 
determine the noise variances and the final values of the residuals under each of the 
representative fault types and levels, plus the nominal (no-fault) case. To account for variation in 
engine behavior over the flight envelope (defined by thrust level, altitude, mach number, and 
ambient temperature), the domain of possible variation in the envelope parameters is divided 
into representative regimes; the final values of the sensor residuals are logged for each of these 
regimes by averaging over all test cases pertaining to a particular regime. The sensor noise 
variance is similarly segregated by regime. However, the noise is assumed to be independent of 
the faults. Therefore, the computation of the standard deviations is performed only on the no-
fault training data, again after segregating the data by regime. 
 
Operating in real time, the engine and the EKF (top of figure) provide sensor residuals, which 
are processed by the Hypothesis Testing Algorithm (right of figure). The algorithm first reads the 
flight envelope parameters to determine which regime the engine is operating in. It then 
normalizes the residuals by the standard deviation values, and compares the resulting vector 
against the available hypotheses to determine (a) if there is a fault at all, and (b) the type and 
level of any detected fault. Mathematically, the choice is determined by minimizing the distance 
between the hypothesis and the normalized residual vector. 
 
Actual fault magnitudes are continuous, not discrete (small, medium, large). This warrants that 
the hypothesis test be modified somewhat to a) recognize the variability in the fault magnitude, 
and (b) provide a real and continuous-valued estimate of that magnitude. To visualize the 
needed modification, consider figure 31. 
 
The cubes in the figure represent the measurement space defined by three out of the p sensor 
residuals, after normalization by the standard deviation values. Plotted in each is a 
representation of the four fault types (HPC, HPT, VG, and PS3 Sensor leak), as manifested for 
an engine operating in one of R possible regimes within the flight envelope. At the left is a plot 
of the end values attained by the normalized residuals (i.e., the hypotheses corresponding to 
small, medium, and large values of the four fault types). At the right is a plot of the “mean 
directions” for the contours in the left-hand plot. 
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Figure 31.—Fault hypotheses for a single regime. 
 
 
The “mean directions” are unit vectors approximating the contours defined by the end values of 
the residuals for the various fault hypotheses. Since the fault magnitude is unknown, we 
assume for each possible fault type the maximum-likelihood value, which corresponds to the 
orthogonal projection of the residual vector onto each of the candidate hypothesis vectors. The 
distances to be compared in the hypothesis test thus become the distances to the projections. 
Upon selection of the maximum-likelihood fault type, the estimate of fault magnitude 
corresponds to the length of the selected projection. 
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 Equivalently, an inner product or correlation computation is performed between the residual 
vector and the unit-length “mean directions,” with the maximum correlation determining the fault 
type. The fault level is subsequently determined via a lookup table that associates fault levels 
with length along the appropriate fault contour. Continuous values are obtained by interpolating 
(or extrapolating) from the three fault levels used in the training process. 
 
Allowing the fault levels to be continuous necessitates distinguishing the nominal, no-fault 
condition from very small faults, since fault values arising from the previously described 
calculation can attain any value, including zero. The distinction can be accomplished by 
applying a threshold test on the magnitude of the received residual set. If normalization and 
computation of the vector magnitude results in a value below the threshold, a no-fault decision 
is declared and no classification (i.e., correlation) is performed. 
 
To determine an appropriate value for this threshold, it is necessary to examine the statistics of 
the no fault data. Figure 32 (upper plot) shows a histogram of the “decision statistic” defined by 
the magnitude of the normalized residuals. The vertical line represents the decision threshold, 
which in this case was chosen to reduce to near zero the probability of asserting a fault under 
normal operating conditions (i.e., the false alarm rate). The lower plot shows the dependence of 
the expected false alarm rate on the choice of decision threshold. In practice, the choice of 
decision threshold is a balance between the false alarm rate and the fault detection rate: too low 
a setting increases the false alarm rate, while too high a value increases the likelihood that 
actual faults will go undetected. 
 
This tradeoff is more clearly evidenced in figure 33, which shows probability density functions of 
the decision statistic under the no-fault condition (blue) and the condition that any of the faults, 
at severity level 1, 2, or 3, has occurred (green). The red line indicates a threshold value, whose 
value directly influences both the false-alarm probability Pf and the detection probability Pd (see 
two plots at bottom right). The “receiver operating characteristic” curve (bottom left) shows the 
direct relationship between Pf and Pd as parameterized by threshold value (red circle). Here we 
have chosen to maximize Pd while constraining Pf to be no greater than 0.001. (This is 
sometimes referred to as a Neyman-Pearson criterion.) The detection probability that results, for 
the assumed fault levels, is 0.97. 
 
Note that the ROC curve “crowds” the upper left corner, where detection is maximized and false 
alarms are minimized. This is indicative of a relatively crisp separation between the “no-fault” 
and “fault” conditional probability density functions. When the sensor noise or other forms of 
degradation increase, the curve will trend away from the upper left corner, making it more 
difficult to achieve the desired detection and false-alarm rates. 
 
As discussed, the training process consists of exercising the engine model to determine sensor 
noise levels and final residual values. Per the previous discussion, it then enables computing 
the mean directions for faults, the mappings between fault levels and vector magnitudes, and 
the assignment of a decision threshold. 
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 Decision threshold of 8.2 was 
chosen to achieve < 0.1% 
false-alarm rate.
Magnitudes in “normalized 
sensor” space (8-dim).
 












Figure 34.—Flight envelope regime, training, and testing cases. 
 
 
Figure 34 is a plot of flight-envelope test points chosen during one set of simulation trials 
(though only 3 of the 4 flight-envelope parameters are represented in this 3D plot). Our exercise 
of the engine model and the EKF for each fault type and fault level in this set of trials consisted 
of 2846 cases spanning the region shown in the figure. 
 
Division of the region into discrete regimes can be accomplished in many ways. In our previous 
implementation of the method, we chose 100 of the 2846 cases at random, and assigned a 
regime to each of the remaining cases according to their vicinity to the 100 chosen points. 
These points are shown circled in blue. We then extracted 2000 points for estimator training 
(green symbols), and designated the remaining 746 for algorithm testing (red symbols). 
 
This method gave satisfactory results during “open-loop” investigation of the aircraft engine 
model, but this performance was not retained for trials performed under “closed-loop” conditions 
(i.e., inclusive of engine controller logic). This performance degradation was due to a greatly 
increased level of variability in the EKF residuals, which were seen to exhibit a fault-type and 
fault-level dependent random noise component and time-varying biases not previously 
observed.  
 
In strict theoretical terms, the method might be deemed inapplicable to the closed-loop case, 
because the fault-dependence of the measurement noise violates an assumption made earlier. 
However, we were able to ignore this fact and yet recover much of the earlier open-loop 
performance by reducing the variability through averaging of larger training subsets. This was 
accomplished by reducing the number of flight-envelope regimes from 100 to a much smaller 
number in the range 7 to 13. In concert with this, we adopted a deterministic approach in the 
assignment of regimes, rather than the randomized approach used earlier. 
 
Figure 35 shows the flight-envelope points of figure 34 partitioned deterministically into 7, 10, 
and 13 regimes. The partitioning is based on three regions in the ALT-XM plane per discrete 
power level (TRA), except at the lowest power level, where only one of the regions was 









Figures 36 and 37 illustrate the procedure for determining noise levels and end values for a 
given sensor. The plots show overlays of the residuals versus time for all training cases 
corresponding to a particular regime point, under conditions of no fault, and for three levels of 
the HPC fault type. The noise level for this sensor (N1) and regime is computed simply as the 
standard deviation of all time points in the no-fault case, shown at the upper left. The end values 
are obtained by averaging the overlaid plots over time and across the ensemble of related 
cases. The vertical line within each plot shows the time at which the end values were taken. 
(The time occurs somewhat before the end of the trajectory, to avoid edge effects from the 
filter.) This yields the no-fault end value and the end values corresponding to small, medium, 
and large HPC faults. This procedure is repeated for each sensor, for each fault type, and for 
each regime reference point in the flight envelope. 
 
The difference between the two figures is that the former represents results with open-loop data, 
presented earlier in the program, and the latter represents closed-loop results using the 
optimally tuned EKF with the described adjustments in the regime assignment and training 
method. Note that the retuned EKF improved the residuals with a clean structure similar to the 




σ = f(sensor, … 
        regime) 
End Value = f(sensor, … 
                       regime, … 
                       fault type, … 
                       fault level) 
 
Figure 36.—Residuals versus time for all training cases corresponding to a 




Figure 37.—Residuals versus time for all training cases corresponding to a 






 The estimator is embodied by three components: (i) a set of p-dimensional vectors representing 
the mean direction for each fault type in the normalized measurement space, as a function of 
regime, (ii) a set of lookup tables that map vector magnitudes to fault levels as a function of fault 
type and regime, and *iii) a decision threshold. The estimation algorithm itself follows the 
sequence:  
 
1) Divide each residual by the noise standard deviation and construct a measurement 
vector. 
2) Compute the magnitude of the vector and compare to the decision threshold 
3) If below threshold, declare no fault. 
4) Otherwise, determine the operating regime from the flight envelope. From this 
determination, extract the mean directions and fault level mappings for all fault types. 
5) Correlate the received measurement vector with the mean directions. From the 
maximum correlation, declare the fault type. 
6) Compute the projection of the measurement vector onto the mean direction for the 
declared fault type, and map this value to a continuous-valued fault level via the 
corresponding lookup table for the determined operating regime. 
 
The results to be presented below represented the following scenarios: 
 
1) Open-loop model data, simplified estimator, randomized regime selection, as presented 
in prior reports. 
2) Closed-loop data, simplified estimator, with deterministic regime selection and a small 
number of regimes. 
 
Table 12 presents the results for the 746 open-loop test points in the flight envelope. A single 
classification decision was attained for each case by considering a time window of 2 s duration 
starting 5 s after imposition of the fault, and determining the most frequently occurring choice. 
 
Overall, the estimator attained: 0 false alarms, 0 missed faults, and 1% or fewer misclassified 
faults. Note that the test cases include variation due to engine-to-engine variation, engine 
deterioration, sensor bias, and sensor noise. 
 
TABLE 12.—CLASSIFICATION RESULTS – CONFUSION MATRIX (OPEN-LOOP) 
FAULT TYPE IDENTIFICATION RATES ("TESTING" CASES) 746 cases
Truth -> no-fault
HPC HPT VSV LEAK HPC HPT VSV LEAK HPC HPT VSV LEAK
HPCe 100% 0% 0% 0% 99% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0%
HPTe 0% 100% 0% 0% 1% 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0%
VSVe 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 99% 0% 0%
LEAKe 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 1% 100% 0%





LEVEL = 3LEVEL = 1 LEVEL = 2 Criterion:  Estimated Fault Type 
is taken as the most frequently 




















The performance with respect to fault level determination is shown in figure 38. Actual fault 
levels are represented by color (small = blue, medium = green, large = red). The estimated fault 
levels are represented as histograms. On average the estimated fault levels converge to their 









FAULT TYPE IDENTIFICATION RATES ("TESTING" CASES) 747 cases
Truth -> no-fault
HPC HPT VSV LEAK HPC HPT VSV LEAK HPC HPT VSV LEAK
HPCe 98% 1% 1% 0% 99% 0% 1% 0% 99% 0% 1% 0% 0%
HPTe 2% 99% 0% 0% 1% 100% 0% 0% 1% 100% 0% 0% 0%
VSVe 0% 0% 99% 0% 0% 0% 99% 0% 0% 0% 99% 0% 0%
LEAKe 0% 0% 0% 76% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0%





LEVEL = 3LEVEL = 1 LEVEL = 2 Criterion:  Estimated Fault Type 
is taken as the most frequently 































Figure 39.—Results using the modified estimator (closed-loop data, 13 regimes). 
 
The results obtained using the updated estimator on the closed-loop data are shown in 
figure 39. True to our design and choice of threshold, none of 747 cases tested resulted in a 
false alarm. We observe a somewhat degraded classification performance, as noted in the 1 to 
2% rates of misclassification of HPC, HPT, and VG faults, and the 24% miss-rate for level-1 
PS3 Sensor leak faults. Interestingly, however, we also observe an improved accuracy in the 
estimation of fault level. These results represent a flight-envelope partitioned using 13 regimes, 
though other trials using 7 and 10 regimes (fig. 35) resulted in essentially the same 
performance. 
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 6.4 Implementation of Fault Detection and Fusion Algorithms 
6.4.1 Overall MHT, NN and Fusion Algorithm Architecture for Fault Detection 
Out of the four fault detection algorithms described in the previous section, we down-selected 
the Neural Network (NN) and Multiple Hypothesis Testing (MHT) algorithms for implementation 
based on considerations for algorithm maturity, performance, ability to be implemented online in 
a FADEC and ability to obtain confidence of the identified fault type as well as the fault 
magnitude. The last two requirements are especially important since the confidence estimate 
allows fusing the results from multiple algorithms based on the individual algorithms’ confidence, 
and the fault magnitude estimate is necessary to engage the correct fault accommodation. 
Moreover, the MHT and NN algorithms provided complementary performance allowing us to 
obtain an overall improved result through fusion. 
 
Figure 40 shows the overall architecture for implementing the two selected detection algorithms, 
MHT and NN, and the fusion algorithm to combine the results from each algorithm and identify 
the fault type and magnitude. The two algorithms run in parallel and use the flight condition data 
(TRA, Alt, XM, DTAMB) as well as the EKF residuals as inputs. The EKF residuals were pre-
filtered with a simple first-order low-pass filter to further reduce noise in order to suppress 
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 6.4.2 Online Implementation of MHT Algorithm 
The MHT algorithm was modified for implementation in an online version, i.e., process data one 
sample at a time in real time; the original version as developed processed all transient data in 
batch mode. The instantaneous flight condition data is used to identify one of the 10 flight 
regimes, and pick the corresponding fault signature. Upon close inspection of the sensor 
residuals and the fault signatures, it was determined that two sets of pressure and temperature 
sensors had no information about the selected faults and they were eliminated from the sensor 
set, thereby using only the remaining 5 sensor residuals scaled by the corresponding 1-sigma 
variation. In this method, the magnitude (i.e., 2-norm) of the scaled sensor residuals is used 
initially to decide between no-fault or presence of a fault. Based on these 5 sensor residuals, the 
threshold for declaring a fault was determined to be 6.7 corresponding to a false alarm 
probability of 0.1 or less.  
 
Once a fault is indicated, i.e., the residual norm crosses above this threshold, the method 
calculates the probabilities of individual faults. To this end, first the probability of no fault is 
calculated based on the magnitude of the scaled EKF residual vector and the plot in figure 41. 
Given that a no fault is declared below the threshold of 6.7, to be consistent with this decision, 
the probability of no fault is scaled to a value of 0.5 so that it is the one with highest probability 
compared to each fault. The remaining probability, i.e. (1-probability of no fault), is then 
assigned to each fault type in proportion to the cosine of the angle between the scaled EKF 
residual vector and the direction associated with each fault type (fig. 41). Moreover, the original 
algorithm was tuned to achieve small false alarm rates, which was achieved at the expense of 
missing a significant fraction, ~24%, of the small PS3 sensors leak faults (fig. 39). Now that the 
results of the two algorithms will be fused to generate the overall fault detection and 
classification result, we can be more aggressive in terms of improving the performance for small 
PS3 sensor leak faults while tolerating a relatively higher false alarm rates. Motivated by this, 
we modified the probability calculations to favor the PS3 sensor leak fault if present. More 
specifically, in cases where the PS3 sensor fault has the highest probability among all 4 fault 
types (or equivalently, the cosine of the angle between the scaled EKF residual and the PS3 
sensor fault direction is the largest), the probability for no fault was scaled to 0.3 instead of 0.5 
mentioned above. Finally, the instantaneous probabilities calculated for no fault and the 4 fault 
types were filtered using the same past horizon used for filtering the fault type detected. The 
filtered probabilities were calculated as weighted averages over this horizon using the 
frequencies of each fault type declared at each instant over this horizon as the relative weight 
for the corresponding fault probability. This yields filtered probabilities for all 4 faults consistent 
with the filtered fault type calculation based on the “voting” filter.  
6.4.3 Online Implementation of NN Algorithm 
During the development phase, the NN algorithm was tested using only the final steady state 
value of the EKF residuals obtained after the fault occurrence. We modified the algorithm for 
online implementation where each instantaneous sample of the EKF residuals is processed 
sequentially. The final layer of the neural network for fault detection and isolation yields a set of 
5 numbers in the range –1 to 1 corresponding to no fault and each of the 4 fault types. The no 
fault/fault type with the number closest to +1 was declared as the final decision for that 
instantaneous time sample. In order to enable the fusion of the results from each algorithm, we 
scaled this number between –1 to 1 to 0 to 1 and normalized them to obtain a measure of 
probability/confidence of the faults/no fault. Finally, to reduce the chattering of fault/no fault 
probabilities, they were filtered by a simple, first-order recursive filter to obtain the filtered 
probabilities for no fault and each fault type. 
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Figure 41.—Probability of (a) false alarm versus magnitude of residual vector and 
(b) each fault type based on EKF sensor residual. 
 
6.4.4 Implementation of Fusion Algorithm 
The results for the fault type, probabilities and magnitudes from the individual MHT and NN 
algorithms are fused to obtain the overall results on the fault type and magnitude. Figure 40 
shows the overall architecture of the individual fault detection algorithms based on the EKF 
residuals and the fusion of the results from each algorithm. The final fault type and magnitude is 
used subsequently for fault accommodation—figure 1.  
The objectives of the fusion algorithm are:  
• Improve the overall false alarm performance compared to each individual algorithm 
especially given that the incorrect fault accommodation in the case of a false alarm 
would degrade the performance of a nominal engine. 
• Reduce the occurrence of incorrect fault classification—again given that the fault 
detection/classification will be used for online fault accommodation, it is better to 
miss a fault (especially small faults) than miss-classify the fault and take a wrong 
corrective action in the accommodation step.  
 
Figure 42 shows the overall architecture of the fusion algorithm. In the first step, the filtered 
probabilities for no fault and each fault type obtained from the two algorithms are combined to 
obtain the overall fused probabilities for no fault and each fault type. The fusion of the fault/no 
fault probabilities involves calculating an average probability from the two algorithms and then 
enhancing/suppressing the resulting probability above/below 0.5 respectively, using a suitable 
exponent. More specifically, given the individual probabilities pj, MHT and pj,NN for jth event (no 
fault/fault types 1 to 4), the average probability is calculated as pj,avg = 0.5(pj,MHT +pj,NN). 







−= . (12) 
 
In the next step, the event (fault type/no fault) with maximum fused probability is identified. If the 
event with the maximum fused probability is one of the fault types, then its probability is 
compared against a threshold before declaring that fault type as the instantaneous fault type. In 















































Figure 42.—Fusion algorithm architecture for fault type and magnitude calculation. 
 
particular fault type persists consistently for some minimum time duration before declaring and 
latching the fault type to engage the corresponding fault accommodation. In parallel, the fault 
magnitudes from the individual algorithms are also fused using a weighted average using the 
corresponding probabilities from the respective algorithms as the relative weights. In cases 
where the fault types identified in the two algorithms differ, the fault magnitude identified in the 
algorithm with the same fault type as the overall fused fault type is used as the fused fault 
magnitude. 
6.4.5 Fault Detection and Fusion Results 
During our initial design phase for creating the online versions of the two fault detection 
algorithms and the fusion algorithm, we used a random subset of 50 runs from the full set of 
2047 runs for the 13 cases of no fault and each fault type and magnitude. The specific 
parameters of the two algorithms and the fusion algorithm were tuned using these 50 runs to 
obtain the overall fused result. 
 
Figure 43 shows the results obtained from the two fault-detection and the fusion algorithms for a 
sample run with medium HPT fault. In this sample run, while MHT algorithm correctly identifies 
the HPT fault, the NN algorithm yields an incorrect classification as HPC fault. However, the 
fusion algorithm enables combining the results from the individual algorithms to obtain the 
correct result, demonstrating the desired capabilities of the fusion algorithm. The plots on the 
top left corner of the figure show the EKF residuals (after the bias elimination) in blue and the 
filtered EKF residuals in red. These filtered EKF residuals along the flight condition parameters 
are used as inputs in the two algorithms. The plots for the MHT algorithm are highlighted with 
the yellow background. The first set of plots shows the probabilities for each fault type and no 
fault. The plots in blue are the instantaneous probabilities while the plots in red are the 
probabilities obtained after the post-filtering step where the instantaneous probabilities are 
filtered using a frequency-weighted average. Clearly, the post-filtering step yields a significant 
enhancement of the probability for the HPT fault type compared to the instantaneous 
probabilities, while suppressing the probabilities for the other fault types and no fault to yield a 
correctly identified HPT fault. The plots in green are the corresponding probabilities for no 
fault/fault from the fusion algorithm. The fusion algorithm yields correctly the highest probability 
for HPT fault for a consistently long enough period to latch to the HPT fault type. The second set 
of plots show the results for the fault type and magnitude from the MHT and the fusion 
algorithms. The plots in blue and red show the instantaneous and post-filtered results 
respectively from the MHT algorithm and the plots in green show the results from the fusion. 





Figure 43.—Sample result for multiple hypothesis testing, neural network classification and fusion 
algorithms for a medium HPT fault. 
 
Figure 44 shows the overall confusion matrices from the individual algorithms and the fusion 
algorithm obtained using the subset of 50 runs for all 13 cases. From these results it is clear that 
the MHT algorithm has better performance than the neural network classification for HPT fault 
type, while the reverse holds true for HPC fault type. Note also, that the performance of the 
MHT algorithm for PS3 sensor faults, especially small faults, is very good compared to. 
 
Figure 39—this is consistent with the retuning of the algorithm to improve the performance for 
PS3 sensor faults while sacrificing some performance in terms of false alarms. The fusion 
algorithm enables combining the complimentary features of each algorithm to obtain the overall 
improved results. The fusion algorithm was tuned to get the perfect results as shown in the last 
confusion matrix for this subset of 50 runs. 
 
Once the individual fault detection algorithms and the fusion algorithm were tuned using the 
subset of 50 random runs, their performance was tested for the full set of 2047 runs for all 13 
cases. The corresponding confusion matrices are shown in figure 45. The results remain similar 
for this full set of 2047 runs. In particular, the MHT and NN classification algorithms have 
complementary performances for HPC and HPT faults and similar performance for false alarms. 
Note also that with the retuned parameters, the MHT algorithm has a significantly improved 
performance for small PS3 sensor fault compared to figure 39.  
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 HPC HPT VSV Ps3 HPC HPT VSV Ps3 HPC HPT VSV Ps3
HPC 50 3 0 0 49 1 0 0 50 1 0 0 0
HPT 0 47 0 0 1 49 0 0 0 49 0 0 0
VSV 0 0 50 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 50 0 0
Ps3 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 50 1
No Fault 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 49
Large No FaultNeural Nets Small Medium
HPC HPT VSV Ps3 HPC HPT VSV Ps3 HPC HPT VSV Ps3
HPC 48 0 0 0 48 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 1
HPT 2 50 0 0 2 50 0 0 0 50 0 0 0
VSV 0 0 50 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 50 0 0
Ps3 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 50 0
No Fault 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 49
Hypotheses 
Testing
Small Medium Large No Fault
HPC HPT VSV Ps3 HPC HPT VSV Ps3 HPC HPT VSV Ps3
HPC 50 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 0
HPT 0 50 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 50 0 0 0
VSV 0 0 50 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 50 0 0
Ps3 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 50 0
No Fault 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50
Fused Small Medium Large No Fault
• Original version was tuned for low false alarm rates – missed 24% of small PS3 faults
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Figure 44.—Confusion matrices for multiple hypothesis testing, neural network classification 
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Figure 45.—Confusion matrices for multiple hypothesis testing, neural network classification 
and fusion algorithms for all 2047 runs. 
 
Finally, the fusion algorithm enables the combination of complementary performances of the two 
algorithms to yield the desired improved performances for HPC and HPT faults as well as false 
alarms in comparison to either individual algorithm. Moreover, the fusion algorithm reduces the 
incidence of false alarms (last column) and miss-classified faults (off-diagonal terms) compared 
to either individual algorithm. This is consistent with our design of the fusion algorithm to favor 
missed detection (bottom row) over false alarms and miss-classification to avoid undesired 
effects of wrong fault accommodation. The fusion algorithm performance for VG faults, on the 
other hand, may appear to be worse than either algorithm. However, the confusion matrices for 
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 the individual algorithms are based on the final detection and classification result at the end of 
each simulation run. Often, the MHT algorithm miss-classifies the VG fault as HPC fault for a 
long duration until finally converging on the VG fault at the end of the run. The fusion algorithm 
result lags the individual algorithms, and thus, would declare the VG fault correctly if there had 
been some more time in these simulation runs. 
 
Figure 46 shows the results from the individual algorithms and the fusion results for a sample 
run with large VG fault. In this case, clearly the MHT algorithm incorrectly identifies the fault type 
as HPC fault for a fairly long time and then converges to the VG fault at the end of the 
simulation run. The NN algorithm, on the other hand, correctly identifies the fault type as VG. 
However, owing to the large mismatch in the individual fault probabilities from the two 
algorithms, the overall fused result yields a fairly low probability for VG fault, and thus doesn’t 
detect a fault. At the end of the run, the fused VG fault probability rises above the threshold of 
0.8 owing to the concurrence between the two algorithms. However, it is not above the 
threshold for enough time to latch onto VG fault before the simulation run ends. There are 
several such cases where, given some more time, the fusion would latch on correctly to the VG 
fault without incurring a false classification. On the other hand, there are some runs where the 
MHT algorithm correctly identifies the VG fault, but the NN algorithm miss-classifies the fault as 
HPC fault. Again, in such cases, owing to this discrepancy in the results from the two 
algorithms, the fusion algorithm yields a low VG fault probability and misses the fault detection 
rather than detecting a fault but miss-classifying it. 
 
 
Figure 46.—Sample case of missed-detection of large VG fault with fusion algorithm due to 
delayed classification as VG fault in multiple hypothesis testing. 
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 7. Fault Accommodation 
Following the overall MBFTC approach shown in figure 1, once a fault is detected, an 
appropriate fault accommodation has to be employed to mitigate the adverse effects of the fault 
and allow continued and safe operation of the engine. The key objective for fault 
accommodation is to maintain operability in engines experiencing the selected faults through 
control actions. Challenges to be addressed include the highly non-linear response of the 
existing FADEC controller and engine, the uncertainty of operability measures, and variations in 
flight conditions and engine health. The following sections detail the general requirements for 
fault accommodation, impact of the selected faults on engine performance and operability, the 
developed fault accommodation approach and results. 
7.1 Operability Requirements 
The critical measures we are using for engine operability are the stall margins for the fan, 
booster, and high-pressure compressor. The existing FADEC logic is designed to protect certain 
stall margins required for safe operation at different points in the flight envelope for an un-
faulted engine. It is our goal to achieve steady state stall margins in a faulted engine that are 
equal to or greater than the pre-fault values. The accommodation action may increase the 
exhaust gas temperatures but must not cause the exceedence of exhaust gas temperature 
limits. On the other hand, it is also desirable to maintain the net engine thrust close to pre-
faulted value as much as possible, to achieve the least impact on the aircraft operation. 
7.2 Closed-Loop Engine Response 
We studied the impact of each of the four faults on engine performance and operability at 
steady state. To this end, for each fault type, we ran a small Monte Carlo run with engines with 
engine-to-engine variation and deterioration over the flight envelope, wheren the specific fault 
type was injected and we monitored the percent change in important engine parameters as a 
result of the fault. In general, the biggest impact of the HPC, HPT and VG faults was on the fan, 
booster and compressor stall margins, especially booster and compressor SM. On the other 
hand, the specific pressure sensor is used in the FADEC only during transient operation, and 
thus, as expected, the PS3 sensor fault had no impact on the engine at steady state. 
7.3 Fault Accommodation Strategy 
The strategy developed for Fault Accommodation (FA) includes the following steps: 
1. Estimate fault type and magnitude from detection and fusion algorithms  
2. If the fault is a pressure sensor fault 
a. Replace sensed pressure value by estimated value (using EKF) 
3. For HPC, HPT or VG faults 
a. Use fault type, fault magnitude, and flight envelope (FE) data to determine 
FADEC adjustments from a pre-computed Look-Up Table 
b. Apply FADEC adjustments, which in turn change the control actuators to desired 
values that mitigate the adverse impact of the fault on engine performance and 
operability. 
 
We initially focus on the fault accommodation for HPC, HPT and VG faults. As mentioned 
above, the approach for these faults is to first compute off-line model-based optimum solutions 
for key FADEC adjustments that minimize the impact of the fault at few chosen points in the 
flight envelope. These individual optimum point solutions are then used to create the look-up  
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Figure 47.—Look-up Table for FA of HPC, HPT, and VG faults. 
 
tables. The look up table is actually composed of 3 separate look-up tables, one for each fault 
type (fig. 47). Inputs to the look up tables are flight envelope (FE) data (TRA, and sensed inlet 
temperature T12 and pressure P0), and fault data (fault type and magnitude). Outputs from the 
look up table are the FADEC adjustments, which are added to the ordinary FADEC signals as 
shown, for example, in figure 1. 
 
The individual look-up tables are constructed offline—by fixing table inputs (fault data and flight 
condition data), and finding the best FADEC adjustments to achieve our FA goals via global 
model-based optimization. These are the FADEC adjustments for the table nodes or design 
points. For a generic input (fault data and FE data) in the online implementation, the 
corresponding FADEC adjustments are computed through interpolation of the look-up tables. 
More details on the optimization/interpolation steps follow. 
 
Initially, we identified 9 FADEC adjustments as potential candidates to be used for FA. In 
general terms, the optimal adjustments are found by solving an optimization problem as follows 
 
Minimize FADEC adjustments Cost 
s.t. Constraints 
 
In the cost we penalize losses in fan, booster, and HPC stall margins as well as loss in thrust. In 
the constraints we explicitly enforce EGT max limit, and use the existing FADEC logic to enforce 
other constraints, e.g., actuator constraints. For the optimization we use a global optimizer 
(Genetic Algorithm) together with a FADEC+engine model (CWS simulation), which enforces 
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Figure 48.—Schematic showing the global optimizer (GA) in 
connection with the CWS simulation (FADEC + engine). 
 
Our offline optimization approach evolved as we learned more about the structure of the 
problem. The final formulation used only 4 optimization variables or FADEC adjustments  
1. Bleed valve adder  
2. VG adder  
3. TRA 
4. Compressor Bleed Switch  
 
A previous formulation of this optimization used all 9 adjustments, which resulted in good 
recovery of pre-fault stall margins and thrust for table nodes, but poor FA for other generic FE 
points. Too many optimization variables resulted in over-parameterization and thus non-unique 
optimal solutions, which lead to highly discontinuous adjustments—very different sets of 
adjustments were assigned to two node points very close in the FE, leading to non-smooth 
tables with poor interpolation capabilities for points in between these nodes. Reducing the 
number of adjustments to what seems to be the minimum possible, together with including in 
the cost a penalty on the adjustments’ departures from their nominal values, gave us good and 
smooth solutions for both table nodes amenable to online interpolation for generic FE points in 
between the table nodes. 
 
Figure 49 shows the design and testing points, in the Altitude-Mach (ALT-XM) plane used in the 
FA approach. FADEC adjustments for the design points (or table nodes) are computed off-line. 
Adjustments for testing points (which are generic FE points) are computed online via 
interpolation. Notice that most of the design points are located on the boundaries of the FE. 
Those set of points can be mapped into the inlet sensor plane P0-T12 (fig. 50).  
7.4 Fault Accommodation for HPC Fault 
7.4.1 Fault Accommodation for Large HPC Fault 
Let us focus for now on the HPC fault type and large fault magnitude. By solving optimization 
problems (as explained before) we obtain the optimal adjustments for the design points. The 
optimal adjustments for TRA = 50 are shown in table 13 and for TRA = 75 in table 14. FA 
adjustments for other TRAs are obtained through interpolations. Notice that optimal TRA 
adjustments are very close to their nominal values of 50 or 75; therefore, for simplicity, we are 
not going to be using TRA adjustment for FA (this is valid for HPC faults, but it remains to be 




























Figure 49.—Location of the 14 Design Points and 8 Testing Points in the Flight 
























Figure 50.—Design and testing points in the P0-T12 plane (P0 and T12 are 
inlet variables sensed by the engine). 
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 The particular interpolation method to be used in our FA approach is a key “parameter” of our 
technique. The interpolation problem is to determine, from the adjustments in tables 13 and 14 
the set of 4 adjustments needed to accommodate a large HPC fault for a given value of P0, T12 
and TRA (i.e., we are solving an interpolation in the 3D space P0-T12-TRA).  
 
TABLE 13.—OPTIMAL FADEC ADJUSTMENTS FOR DESIGN POINTS FOR TRA = 50 
TRA P0 T12 ftype fmag TRA VBV adj VSV adj switch
50.00 14.70 14.88 1 3 49.93 17.87 1.67 1.00
50.00 6.75 -20.02 1 3 49.98 36.40 0.03 1.00
50.00 2.35 -28.56 1 3 50.02 27.78 -0.06 1.00
50.00 14.70 28.20 1 3 50.01 15.84 -1.52 2.00
50.00 9.35 10.22 1 3 50.01 12.89 0.27 1.00
50.00 3.46 -23.23 1 3 50.02 18.40 -0.38 3.00
50.00 8.63 -12.65 1 3 50.02 11.52 -0.08 1.00
50.00 8.63 -10.64 1 3 50.01 14.90 0.13 1.00
50.00 2.35 -45.53 1 3 50.01 20.02 0.48 1.00
50.00 2.35 -17.13 1 3 50.01 41.27 -0.25 1.00
50.00 5.45 8.61 1 3 50.00 17.24 0.58 1.00
50.00 10.11 -4.73 1 3 50.00 15.36 0.71 2.00
50.00 12.23 13.91 1 3 50.00 38.49 -1.30 1.00



















TABLE 14.—OPTIMAL FADEC ADJUSTMENTS FOR DESIGN POINTS FOR TRA = 75 
T RA P 0 T12 ft yp e fmag T RA VBV ad j V SV ad j sw itch
75.00 14.70 14.88 1 3 75.09 15.05 -3. 90 2
75.00 6.75 -20.02 1 3 75.00 20.49 -3. 59 1
75.00 2.35 -28.56 1 3 74.89 19.49 -4. 51 2
75.00 14.70 28.20 1 3 75.00 21.27 -2. 84 1
75.00 9.35 10.22 1 3 74.99 17.79 -2. 07 2
75.00 3.46 -23.23 1 3 74.79 22.73 -2. 35 2
75.00 8.63 -12.65 1 3 75.12 20.68 -5. 61 2
75.00 8.63 -10.64 1 3 75.01 20.76 -2. 88 3
75.00 2.35 -45.53 1 3 75.10 22.02 -4. 21 9
75.00 2.35 -17.13 1 3 75.23 24.67 -4. 30 3
75.00 5.45 8.61 1 3 75.11 20.05 -1. 92 1
75.00 10.11 - 4.73 1 3 74.95 23.76 -4. 71 1
75.00 12.23 13.91 1 3 74.96 22.16 -4. 37 2
75.00 8.31 18.38 1 3 74.97 18.24 -2. 15 1


















The first approach we proposed was to use the linear interpolation provided by the Matlab 
function interpn. To be able to use interpn (see its Matlab help) we needed to create a grid that 
contains the design points as some of the grid points. For the remaining grid points, we 
proposed to compute the adjustments via linear regression. Table 15 shows the quality of the 
FA via this approach (for TRA = 75). For design point A through H, table 15 shows the 2 
columns showing the percent change in the 3 stall margins and net thrust (FN) with respect to 
the no fault case, for fault without accommodation and fault with accommodation, respectively. 
We observe that the Booster SM is the operability parameter most affected by the fault. From 
table 15, it is obvious that the proposed FA approach performs quite poorly.  
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 TABLE 15.—FA PERFORMANCE FOR TESTING POINTS USING INTERPOLATION 
BASED ON "LINEAR REGRESSION" (TRA = 75, HALF DETERIORATED ENGINE, 
LARGE HPC FAULT) 












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 11.04 10.79 -2 10.4 -6 SM fan 11.07 10.82 -2 10.94 -1
SM boost 15.79 11.24 -29 15.57 -1 SM boost 16.06 11.44 -29 15.23 -5
SM comp 35.8 34.98 -2 33.92 -5 SM comp 35.35 34.63 -2 36.33 0
Thrust 27680 27910 0 28130 0 Thrust 32410 32640 0 32400 0
Adjustment        75.079       23.227      -36.052           10 Adjustment        75.097        18.31       -32.22            9












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 10.76 10.65 -1 10.67 -1 SM fan 10.66 10.6 -1 10.37 -3
SM boost 15.54 9.57 -38 10.05 -35 SM boost 14.9 8.685 -42 10.18 -32
SM comp 32.98 33.2 0 34.37 0 SM comp 32.83 33.16 0 32.94 0
Thrust 43610 43740 0 43680 0 Thrust 35180 35300 0 35420 0
Adjustment        75.311       12.397      -17.772            4 Adjustment        75.325        15.87      -20.121            4












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 12.52 12.28 -2 12.3 -2 SM fan 11.39 11.15 -2 11.52 0
SM boost 15.83 11.68 -26 11.03 -30 SM boost 18.39 13.31 -28 14.17 -23
SM comp 39.32 37.98 -3 39.46 0 SM comp 35.36 34.43 -3 37.34 0
Thrust 55600 55810 0 55770 0 Thrust 55730 55960 0 55580 0
Adjustment        74.912       6.9645      -22.156           11 Adjustment        75.105       7.4426      -21.114            8












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 10.34 10.28 -1 10.18 -2 SM fan 10.5 10.29 -2 10.39 -1
SM boost 15.55 9.081 -42 13.87 -11 SM boost 19.11 13.85 -28 14.18 -26
SM comp 31.37 31.77 0 32.8 0 SM comp 34.18 33.34 -2 34.96 0
Thrust 23800 23880 0 23760 0 Thrust 78030 78240 0 78320 0




In an attempt to improve this, we proposed to compute the adjustments for the remaining grid 
points via “local” linear regression; i.e., using only the design points that are “close” to the grid 
point under consideration. Table 16 shows that this new variation performs only slightly better 
than its predecessor.  
 
The third approach proposed for interpolation is a much simpler one, which does not use 
Matlab’s interpn. We propose to compute the FA adjustments as the weighted average of the 
adjustments corresponding to the N closest design points (in the P0-T12-TRA space). The 
weights are given by the normalized inverses of the distances to the corresponding design 
points. Figure 51 shows a schematic to help explain our interpolation approach. 
 
Table 17 displays the FA results for the 8 testing points. It is clear that this “nearest neighbors” 
approach yields the best results so far. Due to its relative simplicity and effectiveness, this is the 
approach we selected for interpolation. Results for FA for testing points for different TRAs are 
shown in table 18 (TRA 50), table 19 (TRA 35), table 20 (TRA 60), and table 21 (TRA 85). As 
we see from these tables, some cases cannot be run straightforward in CWS. In general, 
however, the FA performance is excellent, with almost perfect recovery of SMs and Thrust in 








 TABLE 16.—FA PERFORMANCE FOR TESTING POINTS USING INTERPOLATION 
BASED ON "LOCAL LINEAR REGRESSION" (TRA = 75, HALF DETERIORATED 
ENGINE, LARGE HPC FAULT) 








change D before fault 
after fault 
w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 11.04 10.8 -2 10.23 -7 SM fan 11.07 10.83 -2 10.59 -4
SM boost 15.79 11.13 -30 18.55 0 SM boost 16.06 11.43 -29 12.84 -20
SM comp 35.8 34.68 -3 32.74 -9 SM comp 35.35 34.34 -3 34.1 -4
Thrust 27680 27920 0 28180 2 Thrust 32410 32650 0 32690 1
Adjustment 73.741        29.21      -48.196            7 Adjustment 74.027       17.436      -48.436            5








change C before fault 
after fault 
w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 10.76 10.67 -1 10.36 -4 SM fan 10.66 10.6 -1 10.6 -1
SM boost 15.54 9.54 -39 14.47 -7 SM boost 14.9 8.685 -42 15.18 0
SM comp 32.98 32.85 0 32.49 -1 SM comp 32.83 32.83 0 33.67 0
Thrust 43610 43760 0 43800 0 Thrust 35180 35310 0 35020 0
Adjustment 75.64       20.048      -21.606            7 Adjustment 73.858       17.142      -48.068            2








change B before fault 
after fault 
w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 12.52 12.29 -2 11.59 -7 SM fan 11.39 11.16 -2 11.19 -2
SM boost 15.83 11.76 -26 30.82 0 SM boost 18.39 13.24 -28 12.85 -30
SM comp 39.32 37.54 -5 35.24 -10 SM comp 35.36 34.11 -4 35.75 0
Thrust 55600 55880 0 55410 0 Thrust 55730 56000 0 56030 1
Adjustment 74.864        49.61      -13.388           14 Adjustment 75.142      -93.398      -48.723            4








change A before fault 
after fault 
w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 10.34 10.33 0 9.865 -5 SM fan 10.5 10.3 -2 10.47 0
SM boost 15.55 8.9 -43 13.04 -16 SM boost 19.11 13.79 -28 13.93 -27
SM comp 31.37 31.4 0 30.2 -4 SM comp 34.18 32.99 -3 35.03 0
Thrust 23800 23880 0 24000 1 Thrust 78030 78330 0 79060 1
Adjustment 74.703        20.23      -5.0529            4 Adjustment 75.802      -91.356       -47.51            3
















Figure 51.—Schematic for interpolation by weighted 
average of adjustments for nearest neighbors. 
NASA/CR—2008-215273 56
 TABLE 17.—FA PERFORMANCE FOR TESTING POINTS USING 
INTERPOLATION BASED ON "NEAREST NEIGHBORS" 
(TRA = 75, HALF DETERIORATED ENGINE, 
LARGE HPC FAULT) 












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 11.04 10.8 -2 10.75 -3 SM fan 11.07 10.83 -2 10.79 -3
SM boost 15.79 11.13 -30 16.7 0 SM boost 16.06 11.43 -29 16.78 0
SM comp 35.8 34.68 -3 35.65 0 SM comp 35.35 34.34 -3 35.24 0
Thrust 27680 27920 0 27750 0 Thrust 32410 32650 0 32480 0
Adjustment 75       22.319      -4.2849       2.0079 Adjustment 75       22.072      -4.1825       2.1113












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 10.76 10.67 -1 10.49 -3 SM fan 10.66 10.63 0 10.37 -3
SM boost 15.54 9.538 -39 16.35 0 SM boost 14.9 8.652 -42 15.58 0
SM comp 32.98 32.85 0 32.89 0 SM comp 32.83 32.83 0 32.75 0
Thrust 43610 43760 0 43600 0 Thrust 35180 35310 0 35200 0
Adjustment 75       21.552      -4.1481       1.9371 Adjustment 75       21.084      -3.4843       1.3054












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 12.52 12.29 -2 12.31 -2 SM fan 11.39 11.16 -2 11.21 -2
SM boost 15.83 11.76 -26 16.79 0 SM boost 18.39 13.24 -28 19.1 0
SM comp 39.32 37.54 -5 38.7 -2 SM comp 35.36 34.11 -4 35.03 -1
Thrust 55600 55880 0 55720 0 Thrust 55730 56000 0 55780 0
Adjustment 75       20.241      -2.9478       1.1765 Adjustment 75       19.691      -2.5885       1.5792












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 10.34 10.33 0 9.799 -5 SM fan 10.5 10.3 -2 10.37 -1
SM boost 15.55 8.931 -43 15.21 -2 SM boost 19.11 13.79 -28 18.77 -2
SM comp 31.37 31.41 0 29.98 -4 SM comp 34.18 32.99 -3 33.78 -1
Thrust 23800 23880 0 23990 1 Thrust 78030 78330 0 78060 0






TABLE 18.—FA PERFORMANCE FOR TESTING POINTS USING INTERPOLATION 
BASED ON "NEAREST NEIGHBORS" (TRA = 50, HALF DETERIORATED ENGINE, 
LARGE HPC FAULT) 












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 18.8 18.66 -1 18.7 -1 SM fan 18.77 18.62 -1 18.7 0
SM boost 13.15 10.16 -23 16.14 0 SM boost 13.47 10.28 -24 15.9 0
SM comp 46.07 42.94 -7 47.87 0 SM comp 45.87 42.83 -7 47.7 0
Thrust 7113 7176 0 7060 -1 Thrust 8803 8878 0 8749 -1
Adjustment 50       16.995      0.28184       1.3973 Adjustment 50       16.425      0.25382       1.3403












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 12.64 12.5 -1 12.5 -1 SM fan 14.93 14.77 -1 14.74 -1
SM boost 13.06 9.819 -25 19.92 0 SM boost 12.97 9.733 -25 21.02 0
SM comp 44.17 41.78 -5 45.16 0 SM comp 44.22 41.69 -6 45.43 0
Thrust 15580 15610 0 15510 0 Thrust 12100 12140 0 12040 0
Adjustment 50       29.244    -0.050264            1 Adjustment 50       34.013    -0.049964       1.2835












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 18.37 18.28 0 18.24 -1 SM fan 13.68 13.57 -1 13.58 -1
SM boost 13.07 10.37 -21 17.8 0 SM boost 13.5 10.73 -21 17.27 0
SM comp 45.8 42.59 -7 47.07 0 SM comp 45.61 42.67 -6 46.52 0
Thrust 11690 11780 0 11650 0 Thrust 14910 14960 0 14850 0
Adjustment 50       19.478     -0.99192       1.6521 Adjustment 50       17.994      0.20107       1.0971












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 13.89 13.74 -1 13.86 0 SM fan 7.597 7.511 -1 7.506 -1
SM boost 12.76 9.607 -25 17.13 0 SM boost 13.42 10.56 -21 17.81 0
SM comp 41.96 39.88 -5 42.88 0 SM comp 44.67 41.78 -6 45.34 0
Thrust 9097 9129 0 9056 0 Thrust 22540 22580 0 22450 0







 TABLE 19.—FA PERFORMANCE FOR TESTING POINTS FOR TRA = 35, 
HALF DETERIORATED ENGINE, LARGE HPC FAULT 












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan ###### ##### SM fan #DIV/0! #DIV/0!
SM boost ###### ##### SM boost #DIV/0! #DIV/0!
SM comp ###### ##### SM comp #DIV/0! #DIV/0!
Thrust ###### ##### Thrust #DIV/0! #DIV/0!
Adjustment 35       19.482      0.16452       1.2808 Adjustment 35       19.464      0.15754       1.2712












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 11.12 11.08 0 11.03 -1 SM fan 16.58 16.51 0 16.51 0
SM boost 11.37 9.76 -14 20.51 0 SM boost 12.03 9.267 -23 24.06 0
SM comp 41.23 38.65 -6 44.31 0 SM comp 43.61 38.68 -11 46.65 0
Thrust 3552 3574 0 3507 -1 Thrust 2041 2123 0 2216 9
Adjustment 35       26.335    -0.045197            1 Adjustment 35       31.075     -0.16778       1.5281












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 19.18 19.13 0 19.2 0 SM fan 11.97 11.93 0 12.01 0
SM boost 12.1 11.32 -6 11.92 -1 SM boost 15.96 15.24 -5 16.02 0
SM comp 42.01 39.23 -7 45.57 0 SM comp 40.36 38.21 -5 43.7 0
Thrust 769 776 0 869 13 Thrust 2213 2237 0 2180 -1
Adjustment 35       23.469       -0.449       1.3076 Adjustment 35       20.563     0.082228       1.2122












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 15.73 15.6 -1 15.59 -1 SM fan 2.959 2.935 -1 2.982 0
SM boost 13.92 10.04 -28 17.96 0 SM boost 9.84 9.311 -5 9.85 0
SM comp 41.03 36.82 -10 42.38 0 SM comp 37.67 35.53 -6 40.31 0
Thrust 3359 3446 0 3540 5 Thrust 4607 4615 0 4588 0

















TABLE 20.—FA PERFORMANCE FOR TESTING POINTS FOR TRA = 60, 
HALF DETERIORATED ENGINE, LARGE HPC FAULT 












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 13.12 12.85 -2 12.96 -1 SM fan 13.24 12.96 -2 13.15 -1
SM boost 12.06 8.797 -27 14.53 0 SM boost 11.83 8.501 -28 12.18 0
SM comp 41.83 39.96 -4 42.29 0 SM comp 41.35 39.45 -5 42.37 0
Thrust 16520 16570 0 16370 -1 Thrust 19900 19970 0 19860 0
Adjustment 60       18.741      0.19026       1.3038 Adjustment 60       18.632      0.17883       1.2864












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 11.65 11.43 -2 11.32 -3 SM fan 12.05 11.8 -2 11.58 -4
SM boost 16.5 12.12 -27 21.49 0 SM boost 15.69 11.26 -28 23.08 0
SM comp 37.66 36.4 -3 36.98 -2 SM comp 37.5 36.26 -3 36.59 -2
Thrust 31430 31550 0 31370 0 Thrust 25330 25430 0 25260 0
Adjustment 60       26.641    -0.047489            1 Adjustment 60       31.155     -0.16863       1.5495












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 15.53 15.35 -1 15.38 -1 SM fan 12.66 12.45 -2 12.54 -1
SM boost 13.11 9.832 -25 17.27 0 SM boost 12.57 9.189 -27 13.88 0
SM comp 45.71 43.63 -5 45.28 -1 SM comp 42.44 40.48 -5 42.12 -1
Thrust 28540 28620 0 28460 0 Thrust 32150 32180 0 32050 0
Adjustment 60       22.805     -0.53023       1.3585 Adjustment 60        20.15      0.10112       1.1855












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 11.56 11.31 -2 11.3 -2 SM fan 9.43 9.26 -2 9.315 -1
SM boost 16.5 12 -27 19.83 0 SM boost 13.71 10.46 -24 15.93 0
SM comp 35.63 34.45 -3 36.16 0 SM comp 41.8 39.85 -5 41.1 -2
Thrust 18050 18150 0 18020 0 Thrust 45330 45320 0 45210 0







 TABLE 21.—FA PERFORMANCE FOR TESTING POINTS FOR TRA = 85, 
HALF DETERIORATED ENGINE, LARGE HPC FAULT 












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan ###### ##### SM fan 10.92 10.7 -2 10.64 -3
SM boost ###### ##### SM boost 15.81 11.18 -29 16.42 0
SM comp ###### ##### SM comp 34.63 33.72 -3 34.41 -1
Thrust ###### ##### Thrust 33900 34160 0 34000 0
Adjustment 85       22.322      -4.3398       2.1505 Adjustment 85        22.26      -4.3344       2.1743












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 10.66 10.62 0 10.38 -3 SM fan 10.53 10.5 0 10.25 -3
SM boost 15.57 9.197 -41 15.71 0 SM boost 15.21 8.86 -42 15.5 0
SM comp 32.5 32.58 0 32.3 -1 SM comp 32.23 32.31 0 31.93 -1
Thrust 44340 44470 0 44320 0 Thrust 35610 35730 0 35600 0
Adjustment 85       21.661      -4.1298       2.1981 Adjustment 85       21.976      -3.5891       1.9517












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 11.68 11.44 -2 11.5 -2 SM fan 11.1 10.86 -2 10.87 -2
SM boost 18.12 12.95 -29 18.41 0 SM boost 17.76 12.57 -29 18.21 0
SM comp 36.7 35.16 -4 36.27 -1 SM comp 24.54 33.3 0 34.02 0
Thrust 64260 64620 0 64320 0 Thrust 59320 59620 0 59360 0
Adjustment 85        19.42      -3.1533       1.3824 Adjustment 85       20.497      -3.0147       1.5256












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 10.22 10.21 0 9.681 -5 SM fan 10.51 10.37 -1 10.38 -1
SM boost 15.34 8.76 -43 14.37 -6 SM boost 16.61 10.6 -36 15.27 -8
SM comp 30.87 30.92 0 29.32 -5 SM comp 32.87 32.29 -2 32.84 0
Thrust 24090 24170 0 24280 1 Thrust 86020 86250 0 85890 0










7.4.2 Robustness of Fault Accommodation Approach  
One important issue to be studied is the robustness of the whole FA approach with respect to 
engine parameter variations. Let us assume that engine variation due to deterioration dominates 
other causes of variation. Notice that for the model-based optimization problems solved to 
compute FA adjustments for design points we have been using half-deteriorated engine models, 
consistent with a fleet-average engine. A simple robustness analysis consists in determining the 
FA performance of these adjustments when used to accommodate faults for new engines and 
for full-deteriorated engines. Tables 23 and 22 show FA performance for testing points for new 
and full-deteriorated engines, respectively. At a first sight the FA results for a new engine do not 
seem to be good enough for the Booster SM. However, if we look closer, the Booster SMs 
recovered by FA for a new engine are, in all 7 cases, larger than the Booster SMs for fully 
deteriorated, un-faulted engines, and thus, we can claim that the FA is good enough. The bar 
charts in figure 52 capture this key aspect. 
 
7.4.3 Fault Accommodation for Small and Medium HPC Faults 
So far we have been considering only large HPC faults. Given the FA adjustments for large 
faults, the question is how do we compute the adjustments for small size and medium size 
faults.  
 
We propose to downscale the adjustments obtained for large faults by 2/3 for FA of medium 
faults and by 1/3 for FA of small faults. This is consistent with the scale of small, medium and 
large faults being in the ratio 1:2:3. This approach is quite simple and proved to be very 
effective. As an example, table 24 shows that this approach is sufficient for medium faults for 
TRA = 85 (which seems to be the most demanding TRA). Similar results hold true for small 
faults and for other TRAs.  
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 TABLE 22.—FA ROBUSTNESS FOR TESTING POINTS FOR TRA = 85, 
FULL-DETERIORATED ENGINE, LARGE HPC FAULT 












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan ###### #DIV/0! SM fan 10.81 10.67 -1 10.61 -2
SM boost ###### #DIV/0! SM boost 13.26 10.53 -21 15.61 0
SM comp ###### #DIV/0! SM comp 35.43 34.82 -2 35.58 0
Thrust ###### #DIV/0! Thrust 34170 34320 0 34150 0
Adjustment Adjustment 85        22.26      -4.3344            2












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 10.65 10.61 0 10.39 -2 SM fan 10.53 10.49 0 10.25 -3
SM boost 12.21 8.45 -31 15.67 0 SM boost 11.84 8.14 -31 15.41 0
SM comp 34.02 33.95 0 33.89 0 SM comp 33.72 33.59 0 33.52 -1
Thrust 44490 44580 0 44420 0 Thrust 35760 35860 0 35700 0
Adjustment 85       21.661      -4.1298            2 Adjustment 85       21.976      -3.5891            2












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 11.56 11.39 -1 11.43 -1 SM fan 10.99 10.83 -1 10.9 -1
SM boost 15.39 12.32 -20 17.34 0 SM boost 15.33 11.94 -22 18.17 0
SM comp 37.5 36.16 -4 37.25 -1 SM comp 35.45 34.32 -3 35.57 0
Thrust 64650 64940 0 64630 0 Thrust 59610 59800 0 59480 0
Adjustment 85        19.42      -3.1533            1 Adjustment 85       20.497      -3.0147            2












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 10.21 10.19 0 9.674 -5 SM fan 10.46 10.35 -1 10.38 -1
SM boost 11.69 7.72 -34 11.88 0 SM boost 13.86 9.879 -29 14.71 0
SM comp 32.36 32.26 0 30.83 -5 SM comp 34.19 33.44 -2 34.09 0
Thrust 24180 24250 0 24370 1 Thrust 86240 86440 0 86030 0
Adjustment 85       21.313      -3.9252            5 Adjustment 85       18.811      -2.9887            2
TRA=85 FULLY 









TABLE 23.—FA ROBUSTNESS FOR TESTING POINTS FOR TRA = 85, 
NEW ENGINE, LARGE HPC FAULT 












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan ###### ##### SM fan 11.02 10.7 -3 10.67 -3
SM boost ###### ##### SM boost 18.31 11.29 -38 16.95 -7
SM comp ###### ##### SM comp 34.43 33.1 -4 33.98 -1
Thrust ###### ##### Thrust 33710 34090 0 33910 1
Adjustment Adjustment 85        22.26      -4.3344       2.1743












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 10.66 10.63 0 10.4 -2 SM fan 10.53 10.5 0 10.26 -3
SM boost 17.58 9.542 -46 15.87 -10 SM boost 17.18 9.187 -47 15.02 -13
SM comp 31.16 31.95 0 31.61 0 SM comp 30.83 31.67 0 31.19 0
Thrust 44260 44410 0 44260 0 Thrust 35550 35680 0 35540 0
Adjustment 85       21.661      -4.1298            2 Adjustment 85       21.976      -3.5891            2












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 11.77 11.46 -3 11.48 -2 SM fan 11.19 10.88 -3 10.93 -2
SM boost 20.75 13.38 -36 18.81 -9 SM boost 20.44 12.98 -36 18.48 -10
SM comp 36.36 34.63 -5 35.62 -2 SM comp 34.18 32.83 -4 33.6 -2
Thrust 64000 64500 0 64340 1 Thrust 59110 59520 0 59220 0
Adjustment 85        19.42      -3.1533            1 Adjustment 85       20.497      -3.0147            2












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 10.22 10.21 0 9.68 -5 SM fan 10.53 10.38 -1 10.4 -1
SM boost 16.81 9.135 -46 14.31 -15 SM boost 18.39 10.95 -40 15.48 -16
SM comp 28.9 30.29 0 28.62 -1 SM comp 31.96 31.72 -1 32.32 0
Thrust 24060 24130 0 24250 1 Thrust 85910 86120 0 85770 0











 Point A Point B Point C












Figure 52.—Booster SM for engines at different deterioration levels with/without FA (TRA = 
85, large HPC). 
 
TABLE 24.—FA FOR MEDIUM HPC FAULTS USING ADJUSTMENTS FOR 
LARGE FAULTS DOWNSCALED BY 2/3 (TRA = 85, HALF-DETERIORATED ENGINE) 
scaling adjs for  large HPC faults by 2/3 (except TRA)












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan #DIV/0! ##### SM fan 10.92 10.84 -1 10.99 0
SM boost #DIV/0! ##### SM boost 15.81 14.04 -11 16.71 0
SM comp #DIV/0! ##### SM comp 34.63 34.34 -1 35.93 0
Thrust #DIV/0! ##### Thrust 33900 34020 0 33780 0












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 10.66 10.65 0 10.72 0 SM fan 10.53 10.52 0 10.58 0
SM boost 15.57 12.95 -17 16.13 0 SM boost 15.21 12.52 -18 15.66 0
SM comp 32.5 32.67 0 33.77 0 SM comp 32.23 34.2 0 33.43 0
Thrust 44340 44400 0 44130 0 Thrust 35610 35670 0 35440 0












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 11.68 11.58 -1 11.69 0 SM fan 11.1 11 -1 11.19 0
SM boost 18.12 15.74 -13 18.17 0 SM boost 17.76 15.55 -12 17.95 0
SM comp 36.7 35.93 -2 37.04 0 SM comp 34.54 33.86 -2 35.31 0
Thrust 64260 64400 0 64170 0 Thrust 59320 59470 0 59100 0












w/out FA % change
after fault 
w/FA % change
SM fan 10.22 10.21 0 10.15 -1 SM fan 10.51 10.45 -1 10.64 0
SM boost 15.34 12.45 -19 14.91 -3 SM boost 16.61 13.41 -19 15.35 -8
SM comp 30.87 30.95 0 31.57 0 SM comp 32.87 32.42 -1 33.68 0












 7.5 Fault Accommodation for HPT Faults 
7.5.1 Fault Accommodation for Large HPT Faults 
In this section, we present the results for large HPT fault accommodation using the general 
methodology described in section 7.3. Again, the optimum solutions were obtained off-line using 
model-based optimization at the design points shown in figure 49 and validated using online 
table look-ups at the testing points.  
 
In the rest of this document, we will display the performance and robustness against 
deterioration of the developed FA approach for any given point in the flight envelope and fault 
type/magnitude using the “table format” shown in figure 53. The basic idea is to compare 3 fault 
situations (healthy engine, faulted engine with no FA applied, and faulted engine with FA 
applied) across different deterioration levels (new, half deteriorated, and fully deteriorated 
engines). Note that while the off-line model-based optimizations are done for half-deteriorated 
engine, it is applied online to any engine irrespective of deterioration level, which is not known. 
The columns marked by magenta ovals show worst-case percent change for both cases 
(without FA, with FA). In the case of the 3 stall margins, worst-case means changes in the 
minima over the 3 deterioration levels (e.g., 100*(4.803/12.73 -1) = –62.3%). In the case of FN, 
it means max absolute (i.e., disregarding the sign) percent change over all 3 deterioration 
levels, since ideally we don’t want the FA to lead to significant decrease or increase in net 
thrust. For EGT we look at changes in the max over the 3 deterioration levels. In short, negative 
numbers for percent changes in SMs imply loss in SM and are undesirable, while positive 
numbers for percent changes in EGT imply increase in EGT and is allowed if not violating the 
max EGT limit. On the other hand, any change in FN is undesirable, since we would like to 
recover un-faulted thrust if possible. 
 
In this section, we focus on the HPT fault type and large fault magnitude. By solving the 
optimization problems explained before, we obtain the optimal adjustments for the design 
points. The optimal adjustments for TRA = 50 and for TRA = 75 are shown in figure 54. FA 
adjustments for other TRAs are obtained through interpolations. Notice that optimal TRA 
adjustments were very close to their nominal values of 50 or 75; therefore, for simplicity, we are 





n e w h d e t fd e t n e w h d e t fd e t
%  
c h a n g e  w -
c a s e
n e w h d e t fd e t
%  
c h a n g e  w -
c a s e
S M f 1 6 .7 2 1 6 .5 4 1 6 .2 6 1 6 .7 9 1 6 .6 1 1 6 .3 8 0 .7 1 6 .7 2 1 6 .5 4 1 6 .2 6 0 .0
S M b 1 3 .5 5 1 3 .2 2 1 2 .7 3 5 .7 1 7 5 .2 1 9 4 .8 0 3 -6 2 .3 1 3 .2 6 1 3 .2 6 1 2 .8 7 1 .1
S M c 4 5 .5 1 4 4 .0 3 4 2 .2 5 4 3 .9 7 4 2 .4 8 4 0 .9 1 -3 .2 4 5 .4 9 4 4 .0 7 4 2 .2 3 0 .0
F N 5 0 3 3 5 0 6 6 5 1 3 1 5 0 2 6 5 0 6 1 5 1 2 0 0 .2 5 0 3 6 5 0 6 5 5 1 3 0 0 .1
E G T 1 4 6 1 1 5 0 2 1 5 7 7 1 4 5 7 1 4 9 8 1 5 6 4 -0 .8 1 4 6 1 1 5 0 2 1 5 7 8 0 .1
5 0 2 6 .4 9 -5 .0 3 0
N O  F A U L T F A U L T  - N O  F A F A U L T  - F A
E n g in e  
p a ra m e ters  
o f in te re s t
V a lu e s  fo r  en g in e  a t S S  w ith  
n o  fa u lt , a t  d iffe re n t 
d e te rio ra tio n  le ve ls
(n ew , h a lf-d e t., fu lly -d e t.)
V a lu e s  fo r e n g in e  a t S S  u n d e r 
fa u lt  w ith  n o  F A  a p p lie d , a t  
d iffe re n t d e te rio ra tio n  le ve ls  
(n ew , h a lf-d e t., fu lly-d e t.)
V a lu e s  fo r  e n g in e  a t S S  u n d er 
fa u lt w ith  F A  a p p lie d , a t  
d iffe re n t d e ter io ra tio n  le ve ls  
(n ew , h a lf-d e t., fu lly -d e t.)
F A D E C  a d ju s tm en ts  (T R A , V B V  a d j, V S V  
a d j, sw itc h ) u s e d  fo r  F A P a ram e te r p e rce n ta g e  “w o rs t c a s e ”  c h a n g e
• S M s :  C h a n g e  in  m in  ca s e    (<  0  is  b a d  )
• F N :     M a x  a b s  c h a n g e  (a lw a ys  >  0 )
• E G T :   C h a n g e  in  m a x  c a s e   (> 0  is  b a d ) 
D e s ig n /T e s tin g  
P o in t n u m b e r
 
 
Figure 53.—Table format used to display FA results. 
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 TRA P0 T12 ftype fmag TRA VBV adj VSV adj switch
50.00 14.70 14.88 2 3 50 3.56 -2.75 1
50.00 6.75 -20.02 2 3 50 -0.08 1.97 1
50.00 2.35 -28.56 2 3 50 4.05 0.34 1
50.00 14.70 28.20 2 3 50 -0.13 -1.24 1
50.00 9.35 10.22 2 3 50 -2.14 -0.47 1
50.00 3.46 -23.23 2 3 50 14.41 -3.27 1
50.00 8.63 -12.65 2 3 50 -2.4 0.25 1
50.00 8.63 -10.64 2 3 50 13.66 -1.5 1
50.00 2.35 -45.53 2 3 50 8.2 -2.92 1
50.00 2.35 -17.13 2 3 50 23.32 -1.82 1
50.00 5.45 8.61 2 3 50 0.33 -1.87 1
50.00 10.11 -4.73 2 3 50 -3.28 0.38 1
50.00 12.23 13.91 2 3 50 11.51 -3.84 1
50.00 8.31 18.38 2 3 50 3.36 -2.87 1
75.00 14.70 14.88 2 3 75 -66.88 -0.83 1
75.00 6.75 -20.02 2 3 75 12.45 4.82 1
75.00 2.35 -28.56 2 3 75 6.22 3.85 1
75.00 14.70 28.20 2 3 75 22.68 2.51 1
75.00 9.35 10.22 2 3 75 21.05 -0.94 1
75.00 3.46 -23.23 2 3 75 18.64 3.2 1
75.00 8.63 -12.65 2 3 75 7.35 4.07 2
75.00 8.63 -10.64 2 3 75 18.97 1.65 1
75.00 2.35 -45.53 2 3 75 7.78 5.67 1
75.00 2.35 -17.13 2 3 75 17.87 0.09 1
75.00 5.45 8.61 2 3 75 4.17 2.05 1
75.00 10.11 -4.73 2 3 75 21.42 -0.73 2
75.00 12.23 13.91 2 3 75 19.98 0.73 2






































Results for FA for some design points for TRA = 50 are shown in figure 55. We see that: HPT 
faults affect mainly Compressor SM (~12% loss), there is excellent pre-fault SM recovery in all 
design cases, the FA increases EGT by ~10%, and pre-fault FN is maintained.  
 
Results for FA for some design points for TRA = 75 are shown in figure 56. We see that: (i) HPT 
faults affect mainly Booster SM (5-40% loss), (ii) in general there is very good recovery of pre-
fault SMs, (iii) pre-fault FN is maintained, (iv) EGT increases, and in general is higher than in the 
un-faulted engine.  
 
Results for FA for some testing points for TRA = 60 are shown in figure 57. In general, at this 
power level, HPT faults affect all SMs (~5-10% loss), we see good SM recovery in all 8 cases, 




n e w h d e t fd e t n e w h d e t fd e t
%  
c h a n g e  w -
c a s e
n e w h d e t fd e t
%  
c h a n g e  w -
c a s e
S M f 5 .7 2 5 5 .6 0 3 5 .4 5 8 5 .3 0 6 5 .1 5 1 -5 .6 5 .4 9 5 5 .3 8 8 5 .2 3 7 -4 .0
S M b 1 3 .9 2 1 3 .4 4 1 2 .9 8 1 4 .4 6 1 3 .7 2 1 3 .1 7 1 .5 1 5 .6 7 1 5 .0 1 1 4 .5 3 1 1 .9
S M c 4 6 .6 2 4 4 .6 4 2 .5 8 4 1 .6 8 3 9 .4 8 3 7 .1 1 -1 2 .8 4 5 .7 2 4 3 .6 8 4 1 .5 2 -2 .5
F N 3 5 1 4 0 3 5 1 3 0 3 5 1 2 0 3 5 0 7 0 3 5 0 5 0 3 5 0 5 0 0 .2 3 5 0 2 0 3 5 0 5 0 3 5 0 5 0 0 .3
E G T 1 4 8 9 1 5 3 9 1 6 1 2 1 6 0 3 1 6 6 1 1 7 4 7 8 .4 1 6 1 2 1 6 7 0 1 7 5 5 8 .9
5 0 3 .5 6 -2 .7 5 1
2
n e w h d e t fd e t n e w h d e t fd e t
%  
c h a n g e  w -
c a s e
n e w h d e t fd e t
%  
c h a n g e  w -
c a s e
S M f 1 0 .8 4 1 0 .6 9 1 0 .4 8 1 0 .4 3 1 0 .2 6 1 0 .0 3 -4 .3 1 0 .5 8 1 0 .4 2 1 0 .2 1 -2 .6
S M b 1 3 .5 8 1 3 .1 1 1 2 .7 3 1 4 .4 2 1 4 .1 1 1 3 .5 4 6 .4 1 4 .9 1 4 .3 3 1 4 .0 5 1 0 .4
S M c 4 4 .1 8 4 3 .1 6 4 2 .2 4 4 1 .2 8 3 9 .3 5 3 7 .3 -1 1 .7 4 4 .8 9 4 3 .6 2 4 1 .8 9 -0 .8
F N 1 7 3 9 0 1 7 4 2 0 1 7 4 6 0 1 7 4 5 0 1 7 4 8 0 1 7 5 1 0 0 .3 1 7 3 4 0 1 7 3 8 0 1 7 4 2 0 0 .3
E G T 1 5 0 6 1 5 5 0 1 6 2 1 1 6 1 4 1 6 7 1 1 7 5 4 8 .2 1 6 2 2 1 6 7 7 1 7 5 7 8 .4
5 0 -0 .0 8 1 .9 7 1
3
n e w h d e t fd e t n e w h d e t fd e t
%  
c h a n g e  w -
c a s e
n e w h d e t fd e t
%  
c h a n g e  w -
c a s e
S M f 1 5 .3 8 1 5 .1 8 1 4 .8 5 1 4 .7 7 1 4 .5 1 1 4 .1 8 -4 .5 1 5 .1 1 1 4 .8 5 1 4 .5 1 -2 .3
S M b 1 3 .1 5 1 2 .6 4 1 2 .3 8 1 4 .1 1 1 3 .4 6 1 3 .0 3 5 .3 1 5 .3 5 1 4 .7 6 1 4 .4 4 1 6 .6
S M c 4 3 .5 3 4 2 .6 6 4 1 .4 1 4 0 .3 7 3 8 .5 3 3 6 .4 4 -1 2 .0 4 4 .7 6 4 2 .9 5 4 0 .9 9 -1 .0
F N 5 9 2 9 5 9 5 8 6 0 0 6 5 9 8 9 6 0 3 6 6 0 9 7 1 .5 5 9 1 8 5 9 5 8 6 0 2 4 0 .3
E G T 1 4 9 3 1 5 3 3 1 6 0 3 1 5 9 3 1 6 5 4 1 7 4 2 8 .7 1 6 5 2 1 7 1 6 1 8 1 1 1 3 .0
5 0 4 .0 5 0 .3 4 1
4
n e w h d e t fd e t n e w h d e t fd e t
%  
c h a n g e  w -
c a s e
n e w h d e t fd e t
%  
c h a n g e  w -
c a s e
S M f 1 4 .9 6 1 4 .8 4 1 4 .6 6 1 4 .6 3 1 4 .5 1 4 .3 4 -2 .2 1 4 .7 2 1 4 .6 1 4 .4 5 -1 .4
S M b 1 3 .7 1 3 .1 3 1 2 .7 3 1 4 .1 3 1 3 .8 2 1 2 .9 3 1 .6 1 4 .3 3 1 3 .9 1 1 3 .4 6 5 .7
S M c 4 7 .7 5 4 5 .5 3 4 3 .2 5 4 2 .4 2 4 0 .3 5 3 8 .6 2 -1 0 .7 4 6 .1 8 4 4 .0 5 4 2 .2 9 -2 .2
F N 1 5 1 5 0 1 5 2 4 0 1 5 3 6 0 1 5 3 4 0 1 5 4 2 0 1 5 5 2 0 1 .3 1 5 2 3 0 1 5 3 1 0 1 5 4 3 0 0 .5
E G T 1 4 5 3 1 5 0 4 1 5 8 2 1 5 7 3 1 6 3 0 1 7 1 7 8 .5 1 5 7 5 1 6 3 2 1 7 1 5 8 .4
5 0 -0 .1 3 -1 .2 4 1
5
n e w h d e t fd e t n e w h d e t fd e t
%  
c h a n g e  w -
c a s e
n e w h d e t fd e t
%  
c h a n g e  w -
c a s e
S M f 1 8 .1 2 1 7 .9 8 1 7 .7 6 1 7 .7 1 1 7 .5 4 1 7 .3 2 -2 .5 1 7 .8 6 1 7 .7 1 7 .4 8 -1 .6
S M b 1 3 .7 9 1 3 .3 4 1 2 .7 9 1 4 .3 3 1 4 .0 6 1 3 .2 9 3 .9 1 3 .9 8 1 3 .4 1 1 3 .1 2 2 .6
S M c 4 7 .9 4 4 6 .1 4 3 .9 8 4 3 .1 2 4 0 .9 7 3 8 .6 1 -1 2 .2 4 7 .3 1 4 5 .2 3 4 3 .0 4 -2 .1
F N 1 1 5 7 0 1 1 6 5 0 1 1 7 7 0 1 1 7 5 0 1 1 8 4 0 1 1 9 6 0 1 .6 1 1 6 4 0 1 1 7 2 0 1 1 8 4 0 0 .6
E G T 1 4 3 4 1 4 7 9 1 5 5 5 1 5 4 7 1 6 0 4 1 6 9 0 8 .7 1 5 4 9 1 6 0 6 1 6 9 0 8 .7
5 0 -2 .1 4 -0 .4 7 1
6
n e w h d e t fd e t n e w h d e t fd e t
%  
c h a n g e  w -
c a s e
n e w h d e t fd e t
%  
c h a n g e  w -
c a s e
S M f 1 6 .4 8 1 6 .3 1 6 .0 3 1 5 .9 5 1 5 .7 3 1 5 .5 4 -3 .1 1 6 .0 3 1 5 .8 2 1 5 .6 4 -2 .4
S M b 1 3 .2 8 1 3 .0 2 1 2 .7 3 1 4 .1 1 3 .5 6 1 3 .2 3 .7 1 8 .0 7 1 7 .5 3 1 6 .5 9 3 0 .3
S M c 4 5 .9 8 4 4 .6 8 4 3 .0 1 4 2 .0 4 4 0 .0 4 3 7 .9 7 -1 1 .7 4 7 .4 8 4 5 .6 4 4 3 .7 6 1 .7
F N 7 5 6 8 7 6 0 8 7 6 8 0 7 6 6 0 7 7 2 2 7 7 8 0 1 .5 7 5 7 1 7 6 2 7 7 6 8 3 0 .2
E G T 1 4 4 2 1 4 8 2 1 5 5 1 1 5 4 5 1 6 0 2 1 6 8 5 8 .6 1 5 7 0 1 6 2 6 1 7 1 2 1 0 .4
5 0 1 4 .4 1 -3 .2 7 1
7
n e w h d e t fd e t n e w h d e t fd e t
%  
c h a n g e  w -
c a s e
n e w h d e t fd e t
%  
c h a n g e  w -
c a s e
S M f 7 .4 3 4 7 .2 9 1 7 .0 9 3 7 .0 4 2 6 .8 8 4 6 .6 8 3 -5 .8 7 .1 8 8 7 .0 4 6 6 .8 4 2 -3 .5
S M b 1 3 .7 4 1 3 .2 2 1 3 .0 1 1 4 .9 6 1 4 .5 4 1 3 .9 3 7 .1 1 4 .3 1 1 3 .7 9 1 3 .4 9 3 .7
S M c 4 4 .9 4 3 .8 4 2 .2 6 4 1 .3 1 3 9 .2 9 3 7 .1 5 -1 2 .1 4 5 .4 8 4 3 .5 8 4 1 .6 1 -1 .5
F N 2 9 4 7 0 2 9 4 7 0 2 9 4 7 0 2 9 4 5 0 2 9 4 2 0 2 9 4 3 0 0 .2 2 9 3 9 0 2 9 3 8 0 2 9 3 9 0 0 .3
E G T 1 5 1 2 1 5 5 9 1 6 3 3 1 6 2 7 1 6 8 3 1 7 6 8 8 .3 1 6 3 2 1 6 8 9 1 7 7 2 8 .5
5 0 -2 .4 0 .2 5 1
N O  F A U L T F A U L T  -  N O  F A F A U L T  -  F A
N O  F A U L T F A U L T  -  N O  F A F A U L T  -  F A
N O  F A U L T F A U L T  -  N O  F A F A U L T  -  F A
N O  F A U L T F A U L T  -  N O  F A F A U L T  -  F A
N O  F A U L T F A U L T  -  N O  F A F A U L T  -  F A
N O  F A U L T F A U L T  -  N O  F A F A U L T  -  F A
N O  F A U L T F A U L T  -  N O  F A F A U L T  -  F A
 













SMf 10.45 10.39 10.31 10.34 10.19 9.685 -6.1 10.29 10.18 10.07 -2.3
SMb 18.39 16.24 13.54 14.29 10.49 9.461 -30.1 19.95 16.07 11.9 -12.1
SMc 32.3 32.9 34.01 33.42 33.57 33.09 2.4 32.76 33.54 35.08 1.4
FN 60100 60200 60400 60230 60400 60870 0.8 60020 60140 60820 0.7
EGT 2149 2170 2207 2175 2216 2322 5.2 2218 2251 2314 4.8
75 18.97 1.65 1
9








SMf 10.11 10.11 10.11 10.09 9.679 9.114 -9.9 9.74 9.621 9.497 -6.1
SMb 17.56 15.6 10.99 10.8 9.833 9.576 -12.9 16.55 15.32 13.33 21.3
SMc 28.85 30.51 32.12 31.6 30.73 29.76 3.2 27.37 28.9 30.92 -5.1
FN 15510 15540 15610 15550 15670 15830 1.4 15360 15500 15570 1.0
EGT 1992 2002 2032 2011 2077 2180 7.3 2106 2139 2181 7.3
75 7.78 5.67 1
10








SMf 10.78 10.68 10.53 10.5 10.17 9.653 -8.3 10.61 10.43 9.76 -7.3
SMb 19.12 16.34 13.32 13.3 11.56 10.94 -17.9 18.98 14.69 16.96 10.3
SMc 33.17 33.39 34.1 33.76 32.78 31.94 -3.7 35.15 35.03 33.73 1.7
FN 16060 16160 16310 16220 16400 16620 1.9 16040 16190 16400 0.6
EGT 2024 2058 2111 2085 2155 2259 7.0 2121 2177 2292 8.6
75 17.87 0.09 1
11




SMf 11.71 11.57 11.38 11.34 11.01 10.55 -7.3 11.52 11.29 10.82 -4.9
SMb 17.81 14.91 12.7 13.82 12.61 11.18 -12.0 16.43 14.6 13.38 5.4
SMc 37.82 37.76 38.1 37.55 36.66 35.8 -5.2 39.07 38.06 37.48 -0.7
FN 31330 31580 31930 31740 32010 32360 1.4 31040 31640 31950 0.9
EGT 2020 2063 2125 2096 2164 2260 6.4 2087 2163 2258 6.3
75 4.17 2.05 1
12








SMf 10.03 9.962 9.868 9.899 9.755 9.364 -5.1 9.825 9.742 9.621 -2.5
SMb 20.02 17.77 15.22 15.94 12.32 9.735 -36.0 22.24 18.68 17.97 18.1
SMc 32.71 33.18 34.16 33.61 33.7 33.48 2.4 33.64 34.13 33.69 2.8
FN 80720 80860 81060 80840 81080 81510 0.6 80610 80810 81620 0.7
EGT 2148 2174 2215 2180 2225 2323 4.9 2241 2277 2374 7.2
75 21.42 -0.73 2
13








SMf 11.65 11.57 11.47 11.5 11.3 10.93 -4.7 11.48 11.38 11.01 -4.0
SMb 21.82 19.13 16.53 17.07 13.01 11.15 -32.5 22.98 19.27 15.7 -5.0
SMc 35.66 36.01 36.84 36.14 36.25 35.59 -0.2 36.05 36.19 38.3 1.1
FN 64900 65110 65420 65080 65500 66030 0.9 64820 65130 65180 0.4
EGT 2115 2145 2192 2153 2214 2310 5.4 2201 2245 2299 4.9
75 19.98 0.73 2
14








SMf 12.17 12.02 11.83 11.82 11.52 11.02 -6.8 11.89 11.64 10.98 -7.2
SMb 17.26 14.42 12.38 12.98 11.14 10.59 -14.5 18.95 17.61 18.36 42.2
SMc 38.88 38.81 39.14 38.62 37.62 36.72 -5.4 38.76 38.56 37.18 -4.2
FN 42400 42700 43110 42830 43230 43610 1.2 42500 43390 43340 1.6
EGT 2056 2100 2161 2129 2194 2293 6.1 2147 2204 2324 7.5
75 21.68 0.99 1
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
 












SMf 9.548 9.43 9.254 9.223 9.025 8.785 -5.1 9.318 9.13 8.885 -4.0
SMb 16.28 13.71 12.38 13.36 13.13 12.62 1.9 14.98 14.65 14.58 17.8
SMc 42.32 41.8 41.54 40.69 39.46 38.43 -7.5 43.11 41.94 40.91 -1.5
FN 45280 45330 45390 45270 45370 45470 0.2 45230 45310 45370 0.1
EGT 1771 1811 1873 1858 1921 2009 7.3 1874 1936 2026 8.2
60 3.009296 -2.11776 1
2








SMf 12.81 12.66 12.42 12.38 12.13 11.83 -4.8 12.54 12.29 11.99 -3.5
SMb 14.7 12.57 12.26 13.52 13.33 12.63 3.0 14 13.76 13.54 10.4
SMc 42.97 42.44 42.14 41.27 40.15 39.15 -7.1 43.8 42.74 41.85 -0.7
FN 32090 32150 32240 32150 32280 32390 0.5 32040 32150 32260 0.2
EGT 1749 1788 1850 1836 1896 1981 7.1 1847 1907 1993 7.7
60 1.31882 -1.44674 1
3








SMf 12.2 12.05 11.85 11.79 11.42 10.95 -7.6 12.06 11.59 11.13 -6.1
SMb 18.69 15.69 12.15 13.04 12.05 11.66 -4.0 16.62 15.79 14.92 22.8
SMc 37.54 37.5 38.04 37.27 36.08 35.12 -6.3 38.64 38.61 37.86 1.0
FN 25220 25330 25470 25420 25550 25640 0.9 25260 25330 25450 0.2
EGT 1808 1846 1898 1885 1948 2035 7.2 1913 1967 2054 8.2
60 10.48867 -0.70598 1
4








SMf 13.47 13.24 12.92 12.83 12.51 12.11 -6.3 13.04 12.71 12.31 -4.7
SMb 13.02 11.83 11.81 13.94 13.42 13.12 11.1 15.55 15.18 14.88 26.0
SMc 41.97 41.35 41.09 40.19 39.12 38.21 -7.0 42.94 41.91 41.14 0.1
FN 19840 19900 19980 19940 19990 20080 0.5 19740 19800 19900 0.5
EGT 1738 1779 1838 1829 1885 1966 7.0 1840 1896 1978 7.6
60 6.378578 -0.57304 1
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
 
 
Figure 57.—Large HPT faults, test points 1 to 4 (TRA = 60). 
 
7.5.2 Fault Accommodation for Small/Medium HPT Faults 
We propose to scale the FA adjustments obtained for large HPT fault cases using scaling 
factors from 0 to 1, as shown in figure 58. Namely, the scaling is not only a function of the fault 
magnitude (as in the HPC case) but also a function of the TRA level. Notice that the figure 
should be interpreted as follows: (i) for TRA >=75, use adjustment scaling as shown with the 
magenta curve, (ii) for TRA <=50, use adjustment scaling as shown by the green curve, and (iii) 
for TRA between 50 and 75, interpolate between the green and magenta curves to get the right 
adjustment scaling. 
 
As examples, figures 59 and 60 show FA results for some of the testing points for the case of 
medium HPT faults. We see that the recovery of the pre-fault metrics (SMs, FN) is very good in 














Figure 58.—Proposed scaling of the 
FA adjustments as a function of 




new hdet fdet new hdet fdet % change w-case new hdet fdet
% change 
w-case
SMf 7.714 7.597 7.443 7.533 7.414 7.256 -2.5 7.614 7.499 7.342 -1.4
SMb 13.91 13.42 13.08 14.3 13.91 13.38 2.3 15.43 14.95 14.41 10.2
SMc 46.61 44.67 42.7 43.8 41.79 39.65 -7.1 47.82 45.89 43.86 2.7
FN 22510 22540 22570 22540 22540 22590 0.1 22450 22480 22500 0.3
EGT 1476 1526 1598 1542 1594 1675 4.8 1551 1603 1682 5.3
50 1.107014 -1.10239 1
2
new hdet fdet new hdet fdet % change w-case new hdet fdet
% change 
w-case
SMf 13.81 13.68 13.49 13.6 13.45 13.25 -1.8 13.71 13.57 13.37 -0.9
SMb 13.87 13.5 13.1 14.36 13.76 13.49 3.0 15.17 14.65 14.17 8.2
SMc 47.51 45.61 43.62 44.73 42.74 40.65 -6.8 48.91 47.01 45.04 3.3
FN 14860 14910 14990 14930 14980 15040 0.5 14820 14870 14950 0.3
EGT 1451 1497 1569 1514 1565 1645 4.8 1522 1572 1652 5.3
50 0.258524 -0.85505 1
3
new hdet fdet new hdet fdet % change w-case new hdet fdet
% change 
w-case
SMf 15.08 14.93 14.68 14.82 14.63 14.37 -2.1 14.98 14.8 14.54 -1.0
SMb 13.47 12.97 12.74 14.38 14 13.52 6.1 15.46 14.98 14.96 17.4
SMc 45.14 44.22 42.88 43.65 41.99 40.11 -6.5 47.67 46.55 45.03 5.0
FN 12050 12100 12170 12110 12150 12230 0.5 12010 12050 12130 0.4
EGT 1479 1520 1591 1536 1588 1667 4.8 1547 1598 1676 5.3
50 2.460522 0.609057 1
4
new hdet fdet new hdet fdet % change w-case new hdet fdet
% change 
w-case
SMf 18.93 18.77 18.52 18.65 18.47 18.2 -1.7 18.82 18.63 18.38 -0.8
SMb 13.81 13.47 12.84 14.33 13.65 13.32 3.7 15.83 15.02 14.5 12.9
SMc 47.41 45.87 44.08 45.14 43.2 41.22 -6.5 49.99 48.1 46.32 5.1
FN 8736 8803 8911 8835 8903 9014 1.2 8702 8778 8888 0.4
EGT 1432 1473 1544 1490 1542 1620 4.9 1499 1552 1630 5.6
50 3.505823 -0.34397 1
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
 
 












SMf 10.34 10.34 10.34 10.34 10.34 9.851 -4.7 10.5 10.5 10.19 -1.5
SMb 17.41 15.55 11.74 16.17 11.51 10.09 -14.1 16.79 13.99 12.68 8.0
SMc 29.79 31.37 32.88 31.62 32.62 32.27 6.1 31.26 32.57 33.89 4.9
FN 23760 23800 23910 23770 23850 24080 0.7 23570 23620 23810 0.8
EGT 2005 2016 2043 2009 2028 2116 3.6 2038 2052 2118 3.7
75 5.644482 3.422608 1
6








SMf 12.67 12.52 12.35 12.55 12.36 11.98 -3.0 12.76 12.6 12.16 -1.5
SMb 18.65 15.83 12.89 16.25 12.96 10.39 -19.4 17.33 14.45 13.58 5.4
SMc 39.38 39.32 39.85 39.5 39.21 38.66 -1.7 40.14 40.17 38.96 -0.9
FN 55300 55600 55960 55420 55840 56240 0.5 55060 55370 55690 0.5
EGT 2058 2101 2158 2085 2138 2226 3.2 2087 2133 2236 3.6
75 9.166355 1.180773 1
7








SMf 10.76 10.76 10.72 10.76 10.73 10.33 -3.6 10.98 10.94 10.76 0.4
SMb 17.89 15.54 12.29 16.85 12.77 10.12 -17.7 17.71 14.26 12.87 4.7
SMc 32.04 32.98 34.38 33.25 34.17 34.02 3.8 33.45 34.9 34.4 4.4
FN 43520 43610 43770 43560 43660 44060 0.7 43210 43360 43760 0.7
EGT 2118 2132 2164 2123 2146 2229 3.0 2141 2164 2246 3.8
75 8.771231 2.086761 1
8








SMf 11.15 11.04 10.89 11.06 10.84 10.42 -4.3 11.28 10.68 10.52 -3.4
SMb 18.35 15.79 12.67 16.31 13.25 11.76 -7.2 17.73 16.93 16.6 31.0
SMc 35.61 35.8 36.42 36.27 35.93 35.41 -0.6 37.49 36.3 36.36 1.9
FN 27510 27680 27960 27620 27870 28280 1.1 27340 27460 28010 0.8
EGT 2022 2056 2112 2044 2097 2194 3.9 2059 2129 2220 5.1
75 11.57781 0.679419 1
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
 
Figure 60.—FA for Medium HPT faults, TRA = 75, testing points 5 to 8. 
 
 
Figure 61 shows the impact of a small HPT fault on the performance metrics for TRA = 50 (no 
FA implemented). In all cases the impact is of 3% or less, and thus there is no need for FA (that 
is why the scaling factor is 0 in figure 58 for TRA = 50). In contraposition, figure 62 shows the 
impact of a small HPT fault on the performance metrics for TRA = 75 (no FA). We see that the 
impact can be substantial, and therefore FA is now desirable. Moreover, further studies had 
shown that for TRA = 75 we should not downscale the adjustments in order to have good FA.  
 
In summary, a scaling dependent not only on fault magnitude, but also on TRA level; as shown 















n e w h d e t fd e t n e w h d e t fd e t
%  
c h a n g e  
w -c a s e
S M f 7 .7 1 4 7 .5 9 7 7 .4 4 3 7 .6 1 3 7 .4 9 7 7 .3 4 6 -1 .3
S M b 1 3 .9 1 1 3 .4 2 1 3 .0 8 1 4 .8 1 1 4 .2 6 1 3 .7 3 5 .0
S M c 4 6 .6 1 4 4 .6 7 4 2 .7 4 5 .3 2 4 3 .3 5 4 1 .3 1 -3 .3
F N 2 2 5 1 0 2 2 5 4 0 2 2 5 7 0 2 2 5 0 0 2 2 5 2 0 2 2 5 8 0 0 .1
E G T 1 4 7 6 1 5 2 6 1 5 9 8 1 5 0 9 1 5 6 0 1 6 3 5 2 .3
5 0 0 .5 5 3 5 0 7 -0 .5 5 1 1 9 0
2
n e w h d e t fd e t n e w h d e t fd e t
%  
c h a n g e  
w -c a s e
S M f 1 3 .8 1 1 3 .6 8 1 3 .4 9 1 3 .7 1 3 .5 6 1 3 .3 6 -1 .0
S M b 1 3 .8 7 1 3 .5 1 3 .1 1 4 .8 1 4 .2 8 1 3 .6 3 4 .0
S M c 4 7 .5 1 4 5 .6 1 4 3 .6 2 4 6 .2 3 4 4 .2 4 4 2 .2 4 -3 .2
F N 1 4 8 6 0 1 4 9 1 0 1 4 9 9 0 1 4 9 0 0 1 4 9 4 0 1 5 0 1 0 0 .3
E G T 1 4 5 1 1 4 9 7 1 5 6 9 1 4 8 2 1 5 3 2 1 6 0 7 2 .4
5 0 0 .1 2 9 2 6 2 -0 .4 2 7 5 3 0
3
n e w h d e t fd e t n e w h d e t fd e t
%  
c h a n g e  
w -c a s e
S M f 1 5 .0 8 1 4 .9 3 1 4 .6 8 1 4 .9 6 1 4 .7 6 1 4 .5 2 -1 .1
S M b 1 3 .4 7 1 2 .9 7 1 2 .7 4 1 4 .4 5 1 4 .1 8 1 3 .8 9 9 .0
S M c 4 5 .1 4 4 4 .2 2 4 2 .8 8 4 4 .6 5 4 3 .4 1 4 1 .6 1 -3 .0
F N 1 2 0 5 0 1 2 1 0 0 1 2 1 7 0 1 2 0 8 0 1 2 1 3 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 .2
E G T 1 4 7 9 1 5 2 0 1 5 9 1 1 5 0 3 1 5 5 4 1 6 2 9 2 .4
5 0 1 .2 3 0 2 6 1 0 .3 0 4 5 2 8 0
4
n e w h d e t fd e t n e w h d e t fd e t
%  
c h a n g e  
w -c a s e
S M f 1 8 .9 3 1 8 .7 7 1 8 .5 2 1 8 .8 1 8 .6 1 1 8 .3 5 -0 .9
S M b 1 3 .8 1 1 3 .4 7 1 2 .8 4 1 4 .8 5 1 4 .1 2 1 3 .4 6 4 .8
S M c 4 7 .4 1 4 5 .8 7 4 4 .0 8 4 6 .6 4 4 4 .6 9 4 2 .8 -2 .9
F N 8 7 3 6 8 8 0 3 8 9 1 1 8 7 8 0 8 8 4 9 8 9 6 1 0 .6
E G T 1 4 3 2 1 4 7 3 1 5 4 4 1 4 5 6 1 5 0 8 1 5 8 3 2 .5
5 0 1 .7 5 2 9 1 1 -0 .1 7 1 9 8 0
N O  F A U L T F A U L T  -  N O  F A
N O  F A U L T F A U L T  -  N O  F A
N O  F A U L T F A U L T  -  N O  F A
N O  F A U L T F A U L T  -  N O  F A
 
 
Figure 61.—Small HPT faults, TRA = 50, testing points 1 to 4. 
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SMf 10.57 10.5 10.42 10.55 10.48 10.35 -0.7
SMb 21.78 19.11 16.55 21.08 18.25 14.94 -9.7
SMc 33.75 34.18 35.16 34.06 34.41 35.17 0.9
FN 77860 78030 78280 77920 78110 78340 0.1
EGT 2159 2187 2229 2165 2195 2245 0.7
75 2.029101 -0.02227 0
2




SMf 11.48 11.39 11.28 11.46 11.36 11.18 -0.9
SMb 21.1 18.39 15.73 20.22 17.47 13.7 -12.9
SMc 35.01 35.36 36.27 35.28 35.53 36.25 0.8
FN 55550 55730 55990 55550 55730 56070 0.1
EGT 2096 2127 2172 2103 2134 2195 1.1
75 5.108018 0.090255 0
3




SMf 10.67 10.66 10.66 10.67 10.66 10.47 -1.8
SMb 17.27 14.9 11.52 17.2 14.33 10.89 -5.5
SMc 31.92 32.83 34.3 32.68 33.45 34.28 2.4
FN 35100 35180 35330 35100 35200 35440 0.3
EGT 2105 2120 2149 2107 2124 2179 1.4
75 4.481961 1.396866 0
4




SMf 11.17 11.07 10.93 11.15 11.02 10.7 -2.1
SMb 18.63 16.06 13.09 18.23 15.12 13.01 -0.6
SMc 35.14 35.35 36.09 35.59 35.79 35.76 1.3
FN 32240 32410 32670 32280 32500 32820 0.5
EGT 2035 2068 2119 2041 2082 2160 1.9
75 5.708696 0.402967 1
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA
 
Figure 62.—Small HPT faults, TRA = 75, testing points 1 to 4. 
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 7.6 Fault Accommodation for Variable Geometry (VG) Guide Vane Faults 
7.6.1 Fault Accommodation for Large VG Faults 
In this section, we focus on FA for variable geometry (VG) guide vane faults of large magnitude. 
Our initial thought for VG faults was that since this fault is really a bias in the VG actuator, it 
should perhaps be corrected by just modifying the VG adjustment, ideally enough to 
compensate for the bias. However, this is not the case, since the existing FADEC responds to 
the VG bias causing changes in all control actuators, thereby necessitating adjustments on all 
actuators. So we addressed the VG fault accommodation by optimizing all four adjustments 
mentioned before. By solving the optimization problems explained before, we obtained the 
optimal adjustments for the design points. The optimal adjustments for TRA = 50 and for 
TRA = 75 are shown in figure 63. FA adjustments for other TRAs are obtained through 
interpolations. We noticed that optimal TRA adjustments were very close to their nominal values 
of 50 or 75; therefore, for simplicity, we are not going to be actually using TRA adjustments for 
VG FA. Also notice, for many points for TRA = 75, all the adjustments are 0; i.e., for many 
design points we are not doing any accommodation at all. We have found that for many points 
with high TRAs, the impact of VG faults is not large, and on the other hand FA for SM recovery 
performs very poorly in terms of FN recovery. Therefore, we seem to be better off skipping the 
FA for those high TRA points.  
 
Results for FA for some design points for TRA = 50 are shown in figure 64. We see that at this 
power level, VG faults affect Booster SM considerably (~60% loss), we achieve excellent SM 
recovery in most cases, and the FA increases EGT by less than 10% and maintains FN.  
 
TRA P0 T12 ftype fmag TRA VBV adj VSV adj switch
0 50.00 14.70 14.88 3 3 50 23.43 0.74 2
0 50.00 6.75 -20.02 3 3 50 17.13 -0.76 1
0 50.00 2.35 -28.56 3 3 50 35.86 -11.47 0
0 50.00 14.70 28.20 3 3 50 20.72 1.39 1
0 50.00 9.35 10.22 3 3 50 24.16 -7.24 0
0 50.00 3.46 -23.23 3 3 50 -7.02 18.41 2
0 50.00 8.63 -12.65 3 3 50 18.76 -4.09 1
0 50.00 8.63 -10.64 3 3 50 25.9 -5.48 0
0 50.00 2.35 -45.53 3 3 50 21.64 -49.99 2
0 50.00 2.35 -17.13 3 3 50 26.49 -5.03 0
0 50.00 5.45 8.61 3 3 50 20.72 -2.38 1
0 50.00 10.11 -4.73 3 3 50 24.31 -2.25 2
0 50.00 12.23 13.91 3 3 50 27.97 -4.34 0
0 50.00 8.31 18.38 3 3 50 22.22 3.9 2
0 75.00 14.70 14.88 3 3 75 0 0 0
0 75.00 6.75 -20.02 3 3 75 0 0 0
0 75.00 2.35 -28.56 3 3 75 0 0 0
0 75.00 14.70 28.20 3 3 75 -4.059 -5.6263 0
0 75.00 9.35 10.22 3 3 75 -1.325 -6.3904 1
0 75.00 3.46 -23.23 3 3 75 0 0 0
0 75.00 8.63 -12.65 3 3 75 0 0 0
0 75.00 8.63 -10.64 3 3 75 0 0 0
0 75.00 2.35 -45.53 3 3 75 0 0 0
0 75.00 2.35 -17.13 3 3 75 0 0 0
0 75.00 5.45 8.61 3 3 75 0 0 0
0 75.00 10.11 -4.73 3 3 75 0 0 0
0 75.00 12.23 13.91 3 3 75 14.23 -28.274 3
































Figure 63.—Large VG fault, optimal adjustments for design points. 
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N O  F A U L T F A U L T  -  N O  F A F A U L T  -  F A
 
Figure 64.—Large VG fault, design points 8 to 14 (TRA = 50). 
 
Results for FA for some design points for TRA = 75 are shown in figure 65. We observe the 
following: VG faults affect Booster SM and/or Compressor SM, in some cases SM loss is not 
important (e.g., cases # 3,6,9,10,11), SMs loss of 10% or more maybe important (e.g., cases # 
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Figure 65.—Large VG fault, design points 1 to 7 (TRA = 75). 
 
(nominal) values indicating possibly the presence of some constraints, e.g., VG saturated at 
fully open position, that inhibit any accommodation at this high power setting. 
 
Results for FA for some testing points for intermediate power at TRA = 60 are shown in 
figure 66. We notice good recovery of pre-fault parameters. 
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SMf 11.7 11.56 11.3 11.69 11.6 11.4 0.9 11.58 11.53 11.46 1.4
SMb 19.57 16.39 11.99 19.24 17.16 13.44 12.1 22.47 20.78 19.02 58.6
SMc 35.61 35.62 36.09 34.14 34.55 35.2 -4.1 34.51 35.42 37.36 -3.1
FN 17960 18050 18180 17940 18000 18130 0.3 17880 17920 17980 1.1
EGT 1736 1773 1833 1732 1757 1808 -1.4 1795 1814 1843 0.5
60 17.02719 -23.4946 1
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SMf 15.68 15.52 15.3 15.73 15.58 15.39 0.6 15.78 15.63 15.48 1.2
SMb 13.69 13.1 12.8 9.196 7.095 4.644 -63.7 14.88 12.67 9.964 -22.2
SMc 46.45 45.67 45.2 45.16 44.43 44.04 -2.6 46.35 45.77 45.63 1.0
FN 28460 28550 28680 28420 28500 28650 0.2 28270 28390 28460 0.8
EGT 1719 1762 1827 1713 1756 1818 -0.5 1725 1767 1825 -0.1
60 22.9837 0.85332 1
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SMf 11.79 11.65 11.46 11.79 11.65 11.49 0.3 11.63 11.58 11.47 0.1
SMb 19.48 16.38 12.74 19.42 16.44 13.36 4.9 24.83 23.48 20.58 61.5
SMc 37.64 37.65 38.15 36.39 36.41 37.25 -3.3 35.99 36.96 39.05 -4.4
FN 31340 31430 31570 31320 31390 31500 0.2 31200 31250 31390 0.6
EGT 1822 1858 1913 1816 1850 1899 -0.7 1880 1898 1943 1.6
60 21.83367 -3.71955 1
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SMf 13.37 13.12 12.79 13.44 13.24 12.97 1.4 13.43 13.27 13.05 2.0
SMb 12.33 12.07 11.83 11.15 8.542 5.651 -52.2 18.41 15.31 11.74 -0.8
SMc 42.52 41.8 41.5 41.72 41.24 41.11 -0.9 44.4 44.13 44.26 6.3
FN 16460 16530 16610 16430 16490 16570 0.2 16300 16340 16420 1.1
EGT 1727 1769 1830 1714 1754 1810 -1.1 1747 1782 1835 0.3
60 23.79063 -4.08538 1
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
 
Figure 66.—Large VG fault, test points 1 to 4 (TRA = 60). 
 
7.6.2 Fault Accommodation for Small/Medium VG Faults 
7.6.3 Small/Medium VG faults 
We propose to scale the FA adjustments obtained for large VG fault cases using scaling factors 
from 0 to 1 as shown in figure 67. Namely, the scaling is not only a function of the fault 
magnitude (as in the HPC case) but also a function of the TRA level. Notice that the figure 
should be interpreted as follows: (i) for TRA >=75, use adjustment scaling as shown with the 
magenta curve, (ii) for TRA <=50, use adjustment scaling as shown by the green curve, and (iii) 
for TRA between 50 and 75, interpolate between the green and magenta curves to get the right 
adjustment scaling. 
 
Figure 68 shows the impact of a medium VG fault for TRA = 75 on SMs, FN and EGT, for some 
of the testing points. As we can see, there is no need for FA. The same holds for the remaining 























Figure 67.—Proposed scaling of 
the FA adjustments as a 
function of fault magnitude 








SMf 10.57 10.5 10.41 10.57 10.49 10.39 -0.2
SMb 21.7 19.02 16.43 21.49 18.68 15.92 -3.1
SMc 33.75 34.18 35.16 33.06 33.47 34.23 -2.0
FN 77870 78040 78290 77790 78040 78280 0.1
EGT 2160 2188 2230 2157 2186 2230 0.0
75 1.367171 -5.66918 1
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SMf 11.48 11.39 11.27 11.48 11.39 11.27 0.0
SMb 20.99 18.29 15.53 20.89 18.03 15.58 0.3
SMc 35.02 35.36 36.26 34.19 34.53 35.51 -2.4
FN 55560 55740 56000 55550 55710 56000 0.1
EGT 2097 2127 2174 2093 2125 2169 -0.2
75 0.879674 -4.39331 1
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SMf 10.67 10.66 10.66 10.67 10.67 10.66 0.0
SMb 17.22 14.8 11.35 17.35 15.21 11.88 4.7
SMc 32 32.85 34.33 30.48 32.14 33.85 -4.8
FN 35100 35180 35340 35070 35140 35300 0.1
EGT 2105 2120 2150 2101 2115 2144 -0.3
75 0 0 0
4




SMf 11.17 11.06 10.92 11.18 11.08 10.94 0.2
SMb 18.54 15.99 12.94 18.67 16.24 13.38 3.4
SMc 35.14 35.35 36.07 34.51 35.01 35.67 -1.8
FN 32240 32420 32680 32180 32380 32610 0.2
EGT 2035 2069 2122 2028 2063 2112 -0.5
75 0 0 0
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA
 
Figure 68.—Medium VG faults, TRA = 75, 
testing points 1 to 4. No need for FA. 
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 Figure 69 shows that the impact of a medium VG fault for TRA = 50 is important. It also shows 
that our FA strategy works well. Figure 70 shows that our FA also works for small VG faults at 













SMf 7.706 7.586 7.432 7.732 7.619 7.462 0.4 7.69 7.568 7.405 -0.4
SMb 13.88 13.42 13.07 10.68 10.13 9.947 -23.9 15.35 15.1 14.97 14.5
SMc 46.45 44.48 42.48 46.02 43.95 41.91 -1.3 46.68 44.73 42.75 0.6
FN 22520 22540 22570 22520 22570 22600 0.1 22510 22530 22550 0.1
EGT 1479 1530 1603 1475 1526 1600 -0.2 1482 1532 1606 0.2
50 15.95554 -3.13613 0
2








SMf 13.81 13.66 13.47 13.85 13.7 13.51 0.3 13.79 13.64 13.43 -0.3
SMb 13.87 13.5 13.09 10.57 10.15 9.972 -23.8 15.22 14.93 14.72 12.5
SMc 47.4 45.41 43.39 46.9 44.96 42.88 -1.2 47.66 45.67 43.67 0.6
FN 14860 14910 14990 14880 14910 15010 0.1 14870 14920 14980 0.1
EGT 1453 1501 1573 1449 1496 1569 -0.3 1454 1503 1578 0.3
50 15.56002 -3.16203 0
3








SMf 15.07 14.92 14.66 15.1 14.96 14.71 0.3 15.27 15.09 14.82 1.1
SMb 13.45 12.97 12.76 9.901 9.522 9.277 -27.3 10.43 12.67 12.36 -18.3
SMc 45.1 44.15 42.71 44.7 43.77 42.2 -1.2 49.01 47.47 46.66 9.2
FN 12050 12100 12170 12050 12080 12160 0.2 11960 11980 12060 1.0
EGT 1480 1522 1595 1477 1518 1589 -0.4 1482 1532 1603 0.5
50 9.74806 0.941514 1
4








SMf 18.92 18.76 18.5 18.97 18.81 18.56 0.3 19.08 18.93 18.65 0.8
SMb 13.81 13.47 12.81 10.34 10.05 9.945 -22.4 15.46 15.08 14.67 14.5
SMc 47.33 45.78 43.89 46.74 45.17 43.31 -1.3 52.08 50.6 48.92 11.5
FN 8739 8806 8918 8739 8803 8911 0.1 8617 8685 8794 1.4
EGT 1434 1474 1549 1430 1471 1541 -0.5 1443 1485 1560 0.7
50 15.78677 -2.67706 1
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
 












SMf 7.706 7.586 7.432 7.716 7.593 7.437 0.1 7.685 7.566 7.395 -0.5
SMb 13.88 13.42 13.07 13.24 12.71 12.32 -5.7 16.18 15.65 15.41 17.9
SMc 46.45 44.48 42.48 46.34 44.34 42.31 -0.4 46.76 44.82 42.85 0.9
FN 22520 22540 22570 22530 22540 22560 0.0 22530 22550 22540 0.1
EGT 1479 1530 1603 1478 1529 1602 -0.1 1483 1533 1607 0.2
50 7.97777 -1.56807 0
2








SMf 13.81 13.66 13.47 13.82 13.67 13.48 0.1 13.78 13.64 13.43 -0.3
SMb 13.87 13.5 13.09 13.02 12.82 12.35 -5.7 16.14 15.7 15.15 15.7
SMc 47.4 45.41 43.39 47.26 45.32 43.26 -0.3 47.77 45.72 43.76 0.9
FN 14860 14910 14990 14870 14900 14980 0.1 14860 14930 14980 0.1
EGT 1453 1501 1573 1452 1500 1572 -0.1 1455 1505 1579 0.4
50 7.780009 -1.58101 0
3








SMf 15.07 14.92 14.66 15.08 14.92 14.68 0.1 15.05 14.9 14.65 -0.1
SMb 13.45 12.97 12.76 12.43 11.85 11.72 -8.2 14.16 13.86 13.53 6.0
SMc 45.1 44.15 42.71 45.01 44.03 42.57 -0.3 44.74 43.82 42.5 -0.5
FN 12050 12100 12170 12060 12110 12160 0.1 12050 12090 12170 0.1
EGT 1480 1522 1595 1479 1521 1593 -0.1 1482 1523 1594 -0.1
50 4.87403 0.470757 0
4








SMf 18.92 18.76 18.5 18.94 18.78 18.52 0.1 18.88 18.72 18.44 -0.3
SMb 13.81 13.47 12.81 12.78 12.41 11.91 -7.0 16.01 15.28 14.61 14.1
SMc 47.33 45.78 43.89 47.16 45.6 43.69 -0.5 47.63 46.04 44.16 0.6
FN 8739 8806 8918 8730 8800 8923 0.1 8754 8811 8936 0.2
EGT 1434 1474 1549 1432 1473 1546 -0.2 1438 1480 1556 0.5
50 7.893384 -1.33853 0
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
NO FAULT FAULT - NO FA FAULT - FA
 
Figure 70.—FA for Small VG fault, TRA = 50, testing points 1 to 4. 
 
7.7 Fault Accommodation for PS3 Pressure Sensor Faults 
In this section, we focus on the accommodation of a compressor exit pressure (PS3) sensor 
fault. Unlike the previous faults, this pressure sensor fault does not impact the engine 
performance or operability at steady-state conditions since the FADEC logic uses the pressure 
sensor only during accel/decel transients. Motivated by this, the accommodation strategy for this 
sensor fault is to use another EKF designed to estimate the correct (un-faulted) value of this 
pressure using the remaining eight sensors that are available and replace the faulty pressure 
sensor feedback with this estimated value in the FADEC logic. 
 
For the pressure estimation, where the EKF serves as a “virtual sensor”, it is desirable to design 
the EKF for optimal pressure estimation that is robust to engine-to-engine variation and 
deterioration. Note that the embedded CLM used in the EKF is fixed for a half-deteriorated 
engine (mean fleet engine). Figure 71 shows estimation errors for sensor outputs and for 
pressure at steady-state conditions at SLS for new engine in subplots (a) and for fully 
deteriorated engine in subplots (b). The EKF estimation error for pressure is very small for new 
and deteriorated engines, significantly smaller than that obtained with the open-loop model. 
Notice that the base-line model we use for our EKF corresponds to a half-deteriorated engine to 
minimize the mean estimation bias at a fleet average (for this reason, the estimation errors for 
the open-loop model change signs when we go from a new to a fully deteriorated engine).  
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Figure 71.—Time responses for estimation errors in the 8 sensor outputs plus pressure, for new 
engine (a) and for fully deteriorated engine (b). Steady-state conditions: Sea-level static. Dashed 
red line: Open loop model (EKF gain = 0). Blue line: Optimally designed EKF. 
 
Figure 72.—Time responses for estimation errors in the 8 sensor outputs plus Pressure, for new engine 
(a) and for fully deteriorated engine (b). Transient Operation: Idle to takeoff (SLS) Dashed red line: 
Open loop model (EKF gain = 0). Blue line: Optimally designed EKF. 
 
Figure 72 shows estimation errors versus time for an idle-to-takeoff transient, for new and 
deteriorated engines. Again, even during transients, the estimation for pressure using the 
optimally tuned EKF is pretty good and smaller than the open-loop estimation error.  
 
The good performance of pressure estimation through the specially designed EKF using the 
remaining sensors during steady-state and transient conditions indicates the feasibility of 
accommodating PS3 pressure sensor faults through the proposed substitution of the faulty 
sensor feedback with the estimated value in the FADEC logic. This was verified in our FADEC 
simulator (FSIM) environment wherein the fault detection and accommodation algorithms were 
integrated and implemented in FADEC software and tested against transient simulations of the 
engine. These results will be discussed in detail in the next section, where we discuss the FSIM 
implementation and evaluation of fault detection and accommodation algorithms and show the 
results for PS3 pressure sensor fault accommodation during a transient in section 8.2.4.  
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 8. Fault Detection and Accommodation Implementation in FSIM 
The fault detection and accommodation algorithms mentioned in the previous sections were 
developed and tested in Matlab. For implementation of these algorithms in the FADEC, we had 
to convert the algorithms from Matlab to Beacon, which generates appropriate C-code through 
auto-code generation compatible with FADEC software specifications. The generated C code is 
compliant with FADEC software specifications and can be integrated with the existing FADEC 
code and tested in closed-loop with a CLM in a FADEC simulation (FSIM) environment. On the 
other hand, some functionalities (e.g., matrix operations) are not supported in Beacon, and they 
had to be hand-coded in C directly. 
8.1 Implementation of Fault Detection (FD) and Fault Accommodation (FA) Algorithms in 
Beacon and C 
A mix of Beacon 7 diagrams and hand-coded C was used to implement the fault detection and 
fusion algorithms in FSIM. The original Matlab implementation was broken into four distinct 
segments as illustrated in Figure 73. Each segment was created and tested in parallel to 
expedite the development process. Finally the individual segments and the overall detection and 
fusion algorithm were validated for a few test runs against the results obtained from the original 
Matlab implementation. 
 
Figure 73 illustrates the file structure and calling flow within FSIM. The implementation is broken 
into: 
 
1) Prefilter (filter raw EKF residuals) 
2) Neural network (use neural network to find fault type, probability, and magnitude) 
3) Multiple hypothesis testing (use hypothesis testing to find fault type, probability, and 
magnitude) 
4) Fusion (fuse results from neural network and hypothesis testing to find fault type and 
magnitude) 
 
Initially, it was thought that Beacon 7 was the best way to implement the FD (Fault Detection) 
algorithms mainly due to its widespread acceptance at GE Aircraft Engines. For this reason, all 
but four modules have been constructed using Beacon 7. The four routines to calculate fault 
magnitude in the neural network algorithm - HPCFLTMAG, HPTFLTMAG, VGFLTMAG, and 
PFLTMAG - were hand-coded in C primarily because Beacon 7 currently only supports single 
precision calculations, while double precision was necessary to get the desired accuracy of the 
results especially for the “tanh” function.  
 
Unlike the fault detection algorithms, the EKF algorithm needs extensive matrix manipulation 
and matrix algebra routines, which are not currently available in Beacon 7. In light of this 
limitation of Beacon 7, we took the approach of directly coding the needed matrix routines, the 
CLM linearization and the EKF algorithm in C adhering to the necessary programming 











































Figure 73.—Fault Detection File Flow in FSIM. 
 
Figure 74 shows the various components that had to be coded in C for the EKF implementation. 
The C-code implementation was validated for test cases of no-fault/fault runs against Matlab 
results. 
 
In addition to lack of matrix functions, some basic math functions were also not available in 
Beacon, e.g., tanh, exponential, which were coded in C using series expansion or look-up tables 
(the latter was the final implementation to maintain computational speed). 
 
Finally, a finite-state-machine logic was implemented in C as the main subroutine for the 
coordinated execution of the EKF, fault detection and fault accommodation components in the 
FADEC software. Figure 75 shows the overall structure of the finite-state-machine logic 
implemented in C. In particular, since the FSIM and dry rig simulation runs have to be initiated 
from the engine startup (from no speed to flight idle), the state-machine initiates in a transient 
state, wherein the EKF and fault detection algorithms are disabled. Thereafter, the engine state 
is monitored using the embedded CLM in open loop (OL) until the dynamic states have reached 
a steady state in order to transition to the next state, i.e. “Steady State”. In this state, where the 
















- disable EKF, FD
Steady State
dyOL/dt < tol (OL model)
Steady State with 
EKF & FD
• Identify bias (y-yOL)
• Initialize EKF states from OL
Transient without any FD




engage FA until end
disable EKF & FD
Fault occurrence
 
Figure 75.—Finite-state-machine logic for distinguishing steady-state 
and transient engine operation and enabling fault detection and 
accommodation algorithms. 
 
the sensed engine outputs (true engine simulated with random engine-to-engine variation and 
deterioration level) and the corresponding output values predicted from the embedded CLM 
corresponding to a half-deteriorated engine. This bias accounts for the mismatch arising from 
the difference between the embedded model and the true engine. Also, the states of the OL 
CLM are used to initialize the states of the EKF. Once the sensor biases are calculated and the 
EKF states are initialized, the state-machine logic transitions to the next state, i.e., “Steady state 
with EKF and FD”, where the EKF and the fault detection algorithms are enabled for the 
detection of any fault. If a fault is detected, then the state-machine logic transitions to the final 
state: “Fault accommodation”. In this state, the EKF and fault detection algorithms are disabled 
since the fault is detected and latched and the corresponding fault accommodation logic is 
engaged for the rest of the flight. Also, if in the “Steady-state” and “Steady state with EKF and 
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 FD” states, the TRA or flight conditions are changed abruptly leading to a pilot-induced transient 
behavior, then the state-machine logic will transition to the “transient” state and temporarily 
disable the EKF and fault detection algorithms. Such pilot-induced transients are distinguished 
from the ones caused by the occurrence of a fault by monitoring any rapid changes in TRA 
and/or flight envelope conditions. 
8.2 FSIM Implementation and Modifications for Real-Time Implementation in FADEC 
The implementation of the EKF, fault detection and fault accommodation algorithms in Beacon 
and C enabled generating FADEC compatible C-code and testing these algorithms in closed-
loop simulations in a FADEC simulation environment (FSIM) in a closed-loop configuration 
depicted by figure 1. The CLM is used to simulate the true engine with desired level of engine-
to-engine variation, engine deterioration and specific fault type and magnitude. The FSIM 
environment tests the actual FADEC software as it would be implemented in the FADEC 
hardware and is a critical step towards testing on FADEC hardware in a dry rig setup. The 
generated FADEC software can be thoroughly tested/debugged in this environment in 
preparation for dry rig implementations. However, the FSIM environment is not a real-time 
environment and runs on a HPUX platform, and does not restrict the use of computationally 
intensive algorithms. In particular, the implementation of the EKF algorithms used for the fault 
detection, as well as the EKF used for pressure estimation in the case of a PS3 pressure sensor 
fault were computationally expensive, especially due to the multiple calls to the CLM required to 
generate the linear model through numerical differentiation.  
 
The above-mentioned issues predicated the need for assessing the computational requirements 
of the implemented MBFTC algorithms in FSIM and employing any necessary modifications to 
ensure real-time implementation on the actual FADEC hardware. In early 2005, we 
accomplished the real-time implementation of the algorithms in the Life Extending Control (LEC) 
program, another NASA RASER program, on the dry rig. In the LEC program, the CLM was 
simulated as an embedded engine model in the FADEC software. From that experience we 
learnt that we can afford 2 calls to the CLM per minor frame leaving some room for any 
additional calculations needed by the fault detection and accommodation algorithms.  
 
For the EKF implementation, we need to linearize the nonlinear CLM, specifically with respect to 
9 state variables being estimated and the 7algeberaic (SLAM) variables that are updated with 7 
algebraic relations (SLAM). The initial code for the linearization used for this EKF 
implementation was implemented using central differencing, implying a total of 33 calls to the 
CLM to get a complete linear model update (1 call for nominal values of state derivatives and 
outputs and 2*(9+7) calls for central difference calculations). On top of these 33 calls to the 
CLM for linear model generation, the EKF implementation was designed for propagate and 
measurement update at the minor frame rate, adding 2 additional calls for state derivative and 
output evaluations, respectively. Moreover, the fault detection algorithm relies on simulating an 
open-loop half-deteriorated engine model to determine when we reach a steady state (see the 
state machine logic in figure 75) and thereafter calculate a bias correction in all 9 sensors to 
correct for the fact that the actual engine has a random engine-to-engine variation and 
deterioration. So, altogether, the fault detection algorithm involved 36 calls to the embedded 
CLM at the minor frame rate, which is clearly not feasible for implementation on the FADEC.  
 
Motivated by this, we modified the fault detection algorithm such that the embedded CLM is 
never called more than 2 times in any minor frame, to leave some time for the rest of the 
calculations (matrix multiplications and inversion in the EKF implementation, fault detection and 
fusion algorithms). In particular, we modified the propagation and measurement update to occur 
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 at intervals of 4 minor frames, as well as the open-loop model integration at 4 minor frame 
intervals (synchronized with the EKF propagation calls). Also, we modified the linearization to 
use only a forward difference method, and distribute the calls for baseline values of state 
derivatives and outputs and perturbations of the 9 states and 7 algebraic (SLAM) variables over 
a cycle of 16 minor frames. Thus, the linear model is now updated every 16 minor frames, which 
is still fairly fast compared to the dynamics of the 9 states being estimated.  
 
Figure 76 shows the detailed sequence of calls to the CLM for open-loop model simulation, 
linear model generation and the EKF, never exceeding more than 2 calls to the CLM in each 
minor frame and generating a new linear model over a cycle of 16 minor frames. 
 
We have validated the above modifications to the fault detection algorithms in FSIM to ensure 
that the algorithm indeed runs much faster than before without any detrimental impact on the 
performance for fault detection and isolation.  
 
Once a fault is detected and isolated, the state machine logic moves to the fault accommodation 
state and engages the requisite fault accommodation. The open-loop model call and the fault 
detection EKF are no longer needed. The fault accommodation for HPC, HPT and VG faults 
involve lookup tables, which is not very computationally expensive, so we don’t foresee any 
problem in real-time implementation for these on the FADEC. On the other hand, for the case of 
pressure sensor fault, the fault accommodation involves another EKF used to estimate the 
correct value of pressure using the remaining 8 sensors. In our initial implementation of this EKF 
in FSIM, a numerical differentiation of the CLM was used to generate the linear model with 
forward differencing for the 9 state variables and 7 algebraic (SLAM) variables. Thus, the linear 
model generation involved 17 (1 for baseline value of state derivatives and outputs and 16 for 
the perturbations of state and algebraic variables). Including the 2 additional calls for the 
propagation and measurement update in the EKF, there were altogether 19 calls to the CLM. 
Similar, to the EKF for fault detection, we modified this EKF for pressure estimation to distribute 
the calls to the CLM over a cycle of 18 minor frames. Figure 77 shows the detailed sequence of 
calls to the embedded CLM, never exceeding 2 calls in any minor frame. The propagation and 
measurement updates were modified to occur at intervals of 2 minor frames and a new linear 
model is generated every 18 minor frames. 
 
The above modifications for the pressure estimation EKF were also implemented and validated 
in FSIM to ensure that we get a good pressure estimation performance during transients as with 
the original implementation, while it runs significantly faster. 
 
In addition to the above major changes in the CLM linearization and EKF algorithms for fault 
detection and accommodation, we also implemented some minor changes to speed up the 
computation. In particular, the NN algorithm involves the use of the tanh function. The initial 
implementation was achieved through calls to the exp function, which in turn employed a series 
calculation (Taylor series) until a desired accuracy was achieved. This was computationally too 
expensive. The tanh function was modified to use a lookup table, which is considerably faster. 
Similarly, the fusion algorithm requires the use of an exponential calculation (see eq. (12)). 
Initially, this was implemented through the use of log and exp functions, which in turn used 
Taylor series calculations and was, thus, very expensive. This function was also replaced with a 

























1 1 1 - - -
2 - - - 1 1
3 - - 1 - 2
4 - - - - 3, 4
5 1 1 - - - -
6 - - - - 5, 6 -
7 - - 1 - 7 -
8 - - - - 8, 9 -
9 1 1 - - - -
10 - - - - - 1, 2
11 - - 1 - - 3
12 - - - - - 4, 5
13 1 1 - - - -
14 - - - - - 6, 7
15 - - 1 - - new linear model
16 - - - - - -  
 



















1 1 - 1 - -
2 - 1 - 1 -
3 1 - - 2 -
4 - 1 - 3 -
5 1 - - 4 -
6 - 1 - 5 -
7 1 - - 6 -
8 - 1 - 7 -
9 1 - - 8 -
10 - 1 - 9 -
11 1 - - - 1
12 - 1 - - 2
13 1 - - - 3
14 - 1 - - 4
15 1 - - - 5
16 - 1 - - 6
17 1 - - - 7
18 - 1 - - new linear model  
Figure 77.—Sequence of calls to CLM for linearization and EKF for pressure estimation. 
 
 
With the above modifications, it was verified that the FSIM simulations were accelerated 
considerably compared to the initial baseline version. The performance of this optimized FSIM 
implementation was validated against the baseline version to ensure against loss of 
performance. The next few sections provide sample illustrative runs for each of the fault type, 
using the final optimized FSIM implementation. 
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 8.2.1 FSIM Implementation for HPC Fault 
Figure 78 shows the performance of the real-time version of the FSIM implementation for a 
medium HPC fault. The system achieves a steady-state condition and then the medium HPC 
fault is injected at t = 215s, which leads to a significant loss in the booster and HPC stall 
margins. The fault detection algorithm detects the medium HPC fault at t = 225s and employs 
the corresponding fault accommodation. The fault accommodation provides good recovery of 
booster and HPC stall margins to pre-fault values, without any significant impact on thrust; there 
is very little impact on the fan stall margin due to this fault. 
8.2.2 FSIM Implementation for HPT Fault 
Figure 79 shows the performance of the real-time version of the FSIM implementation for a 
medium HPT fault. The system achieves a steady-state condition and then the medium HPT 
fault is injected at t = 215s, leading to loss in booster and HPC stall margins. The fault detection 
algorithm detects the medium HPT fault at t = 225s and employs the corresponding fault 
accommodation. The fault accommodation again leads to a good recovery of booster and HPC 
stall margins to pre-fault values or better, without any significant impact on thrust; there is very 
little impact on the fan stall margin due to this fault. 
8.2.3 FSIM Implementation for VG Fault 
Figure 80 shows the performance of the real-time version of the FSIM implementation for a 
large VG fault. The system achieves a steady-state condition and then the large VG fault is 
injected at t = 215s, which leads to a slight loss in HPC stall margin. The fault detection 
algorithm detects the large VG fault at t = 225s and employs the corresponding fault 
accommodation. The fault accommodation yields good recovery of the HPC stall margins to pre-
fault value, without any significant impact on thrust; there is very little impact on the fan or 
booster stall margin due to this fault at this flight condition. 
 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 79.—Performance of real-time version of FSIM for a medium HPT fault. 
 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 80.—Performance of real-time version of FSIM for large VG fault. 
 
8.2.4 FSIM Implementation for Pressure Sensor Fault 
Figure 81 shows the performance of the optimized real-time version of FSIM implementation for 
a large PS3 pressure sensor fault in the presence of TRA transients, with changes in TRA from 
60 to 70, to 75 and finally to 85—as mentioned before, the pressure sensor has impact on the 
engine performance only during transient operation. In this simulation, the system is at steady 
state at TRA 60, and the pressure sensor fault is introduced. The results are very much the 
same as obtained by the initial (non-real-time) version of the logic. Clearly, while the faulty 
pressure sensor (in blue) is quite different during the transient sequence compared to the un-
faulted (in red) sequence, the estimated pressure sequence (in green) obtained during the 
sensor fault accommodation is the same as the un-faulted sequence. The bottom plot shows the 
corresponding error between the faulted and estimated pressure values compared to the 
baseline, un-faulted sequence. 
 
NASA/CR—2008-215273 85
 TRA 70TRA 60 TRA 85TRA 75
 
 




faulted) thrust performance 
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Figure 82.—Comparison of fan, booster and compressor stall margins and net thrust for un-
faulted engine (red), faulted engine without accommodation, i.e., using faulted pressure 
feedback (blue) and faulted engine with accommodation, i.e., using estimated pressure 
feedback (green). 
 
Figure 82 shows, the comparison of the stall margins in the fan, booster and HPC as well as the 
net thrust during this TRA sequence for the nominal un-faulted engine (red), faulted engine 
without any accommodation, i.e., using the faulty pressure feedback in FADEC (blue) and the 
faulted engine with accommodation, i.e., using the estimated pressure feedback in FADEC 
(green). Clearly, the sensor fault accommodation enables a near-perfect recovery of the un-
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 faulted performance, while the faulted engine suffers significant deterioration in transient thrust 
response due to the faulty pressure feedback, especially during the TRA step from 75 to 85. 
9. Conclusions 
In this program, we have successfully developed and demonstrated the MBFTC technology for 
achieving the desired objectives of automated on-wing detection and accommodation of engine 
component faults. For this program, we focused on four key fault types from different engine 
control system components, i.e., sensor, actuator and gas-path turbo-machinery component. 
For these faults, we developed multiple model-based fault detection algorithms, which employ at 
their core the use of an Extended Kalman Filter (EKF). The EKF is in turn implemented using an 
embedded engine model, namely the component level model (CLM). The EKF allows 
accounting for system nonlinearities, and a wide variety of variations in an optimal manner, 
thereby facilitating the fault detection and isolation. 
 
We tested the robustness and performance of the developed fault detection algorithms for all 
four fault types and different magnitudes, using extensive Monte Carlo simulations covering the 
entire flight envelope and in the presence of engine-to-engine variations, deterioration and 
sensor noise. A key step towards this was the optimized tuning of the EKF to minimize the 
impact of variation sources, while generating a structured residual pattern correlated with fault 
types and magnitudes. Two fault detection algorithms were implemented in parallel, namely (i) 
multiple hypothesis testing, and (ii) neural network, and a fusion algorithm was employed to 
exploit the complementary performance of these individual algorithms to achieve excellent 
overall fault detection performance.  
 
The detection of fault type and magnitude allowed the use of automated fault accommodation 
through FADEC adjustments to take appropriate corrective control action and mitigate the 
adverse impact of the faults on the engine operability and performance. In general, the impact of 
these faults was predominantly seen in loss of booster and compressor stall margins. The 
accommodation strategy was designed to recover the lost stall margins while maintaining pre-
fault thrust. To this end, off-line model-based optimization was performed for combinations of 
fault types and magnitudes at various points in the flight envelope to generate look-up tables for 
optimal FADEC adjustments, which were in turn interpolated online for optimal accommodation 
based on identified fault type and magnitude. The performance of the fault accommodation 
strategy was tested through simulations at various flight conditions, for new and deteriorated 
engines, and all four fault types and different fault magnitudes. On the other hand, for the 
pressure sensor fault, the fault accommodation strategy involved the use of a specially designed 
and tuned EKF that used the remaining sensors for optimal estimation of the true pressure 
value, and replacing the faulty pressure sensor feedback with the estimated value. The 
performance of this approach was verified during transient accelerations to demonstrate the 
recovery of un-faulted transient engine control performance. 
 
The developed fault detection and accommodation algorithms were implemented and tested in 
a FADEC simulation (FSIM) environment, wherein the actual FADEC compatible software was 
tested in closed-loop simulations using the CLM to simulate the true engine with any variation 
and fault type/magnitude. This is a critical step in validating the FADEC software and 
implementing it on the actual FADEC hardware for dry rig testing. While we have been unable to 
implement and test the software in a dry rig due to problems with getting access to an 
appropriate commercial engine rig, we have addressed all likely issues pertaining to real-time 
implementation of the MBFTC algorithms in the real FADEC hardware. We are very confident 
that the final real-time version of the FSIM software will run in real-time on the actual FADEC. 
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 In this program, we used a fixed embedded CLM in the EKF without any parameter adaptation 
to match the model to a particular engine with engine-to-engine variation and deterioration level. 
Rather, we followed the approach of tuning the EKF to be robust to these engine variations. A 
possible future extension is to incorporate a “tracking filter” to update the embedded engine 
model health parameters to match a specific engine, thereby allowing improved fault detection 
and isolation performance, especially during transient operation. Moreover, the tracking filter will 
provide an estimate of engine deterioration, thereby enabling fault accommodation tailored for 
the specific level of deterioration in the engine. Another obvious extension is to expand the set 
of faults considered to encompass all sensor, actuator, and turbo-machinery component faults.  
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